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Executive Summary 
 
Ethiopia is one of the most mine-affected countries in Africa, with contamination 
stemming from a series of internal and international armed conflicts, including: 
 
• the Italian invasion and subsequent East Africa Campaigns (1935-1941),  
• the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978),  
• a border war with Sudan (1980),  
• internal conflict (1974-1991), and  
• the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998-2000). 
 
The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) found more than 1.9 million people 
living in a total of 1,492 mine-affected communities. Ten of the 11 regions1 are 
affected to some degree, but the bulk of the contamination is in Afar and Tigray 
(bordering Eritrea, with ‘classic’ defensive minefields along trench lines stretching for 
hundreds of kilometres) and Somali Region (site of the Ogaden War, with more 
dispersed landmine and UXO contamination). The ELIS also recorded 16,616 
casualties, more that half of whom had been killed.  
 
Ethiopia’s humanitarian demining efforts began in 1995, when the U.S. provided 
training and equipment to the Ethiopia Demining Project – three non-combatant 
demining companies under the Ministry of Defence. However, in 2001 the 
Government decided to establish a civilian agency – the Ethiopian Mine Action 
Office (EMAO) – to implement the demining component of its Emergency 
Rehabilitation Programme (ERP), designed for the sustainable resettlement of over 
360,000 people displaced by the border war with Eritrea. 
 
With assistance from a Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT) from the UNDP and 
from the firm RONCO (funded by the U.S.), EMAO trained and equipped two 
demining companies, which began operations in 2002 in Tigray. Since then, four 
additional companies have been trained, equipped, and deployed. At the present time, 
four companies are based in Tigray, one in Afar, and one in the Jijiga woreda of 
Somali Region. In 2004, EMAO acquired three mini-flail demining machines (by 
purchase) and six Mine Detection Dogs (MDD – on lease with handlers from 
ArmorGroup) to support manual demining operations. 
 
In 2004, EMAO and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA – the NGO that conducted the 
ELIS) began discussions concerning assistance to support EMAO’s capacity 
development efforts. The Humanitarian Mine Action Project was agreed in mid-2005, 
with NPA to focus on MDD and Technical Survey capacities (the latter supplemented 
with socio-economic survey/analysis, which NPA terms Task Impact Assessment or 
TIA). With initial funding from Norway and Finland, NPA began operations in 
October 2005. The project is scheduled to run until the end of 2007. 
  
The project also provided for a mid-term evaluation. Accordingly, in early 2006 NPA 
invited the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD or the 
Centre) to conduct the mid-term evaluation. The GICHD recommended expanding the 
                                                
1 More precisely, there are nine regions and two special urban regions (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). 
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scope of the exercise to cover Ethiopia’s mine action programme as a whole, 
including the contribution of mine action to national development. In July 2006, 
EMAO, NPA, and the Centre agreed on the broader review as a complement to the 
evaluation (covering relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and safety) of the NPA 
project. The three-week evaluation mission took place in October/November 2006. 
 
Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
 
EMAO is the most important mine action organisation in Ethiopia. Since it began 
operations in 2002, EMAO has worked on a series of five demining contracts issued 
by the Emergency Rehabilitation Program Management Unit (ERPMU), following 
priorities specified by the ERPMU after consultations with the Regional Governments 
in Tigray and Afar.2 In total, the ERPMU has provided about $18.5 million for the 
demining component (demining plus the procurement of equipment and technical 
advisors), for which EMAO demined (i.e. cleared or released as safe following 
Technical Survey) over 24 km2 of land.3  
 
EMAO currently has a total staff complement of about 840, including 450 deminers, 
as well as three mini-flails and (currently) 19 MDD provided through NPA.4 These 
assets are organised in large demining companies, each of which is based in one 
location for extended periods – an efficient way of working on the large minefields 
found in Tigray, Afar, and Somali. Currently, EMAO has limited capacity to respond 
to small tasks on a responsive basis (e.g. when a community uncovers a cache of 
UXO or a small minefield), but it is planning to establish Rapid Response Teams. 
 
The Minister of Federal Affairs has responsibility for EMAO, which has a Board 
chaired by the former Minister of Defence, with members drawn from the Ministries 
of Defence, Finance and Economic Development, Transportation, Communications, 
and Foreign Affairs.5 The Board is charged with establishing policies for and 
oversight of EMAO’s demining and MRE operations; not for adopting strategies and 
policies to guide all actors involved in a national mine action programme. 
 
A recent socio-economic assessment of the ERP concluded that “the impact of the de-
mining activities is commendable” and demining has allowed most of the displaced 
people from mine-affected communities to return in safety. The assessment also 
concluded that “The experiences gained in successfully implementing the project, 
particularly the skills and experiences gained by the project staff at all 
levels…especially in mine clearance, have been remarkable and would remain to be 
useful in the future.”  
 
                                                
2 This year, EMAO has also had a company demining in Jigiga on tasks identified as a priority by the 
Somali regional government. The ERPMU has covered these demining costs. 
3 The ERPMU estimated an average cost of around $0.77 m2, which compares very favourably with 
other demining programmes in the world. This does not include the cost of technical assistance 
provided through the UN MAAT, RONCO, or (now) NPA. 
4 EMAO community liaison officers also provide MRE for communities in the proximity of demining 
operations. 
5 EMAO originally fell under the Office of the Prime Minister. The Director General of EMAO is also 
a member of the Board. 
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EMAO has completed a strategic plan for 2006-2011, which has not yet been 
approved by the Council of Ministers.6 This document was prepared as part of the 
Federal Government’s Civil Service Reform Programme and appears to serve more as 
a corporate strategy for EMAO as an organisation than a strategy for a national mine 
action programme (i.e. a document that serves to coordinate the actions of all actors 
involved, directly or indirectly, in all components of mine action). 
 
There is no other demining organisation operating independently in Ethiopia (NPA’s 
demining operations are to build EMAO capacities). Until last year, the ERPMU had 
a small unit responsible for quality assurance (QA) of EMAO’s demining work, 
which also issued clearance certificates certifying that land has been cleared to 
international standard. Over the past year, EMAO has assumed responsibility for QA. 
 
Since 1999, MRE services were provided in the Tigray and Afar regions by the Relief 
and Development Organisation (RaDO); a local NGO supported mainly by UNICEF, 
which also maintained a victim surveillance system within those regions. In 2004-05, 
RaDO was asked by UNICEF to transfer responsibilities for MRE and victim 
surveillance to regional bureaus in both Tigray and Afar,7 but neither of these regional 
bureaus has continued the provision of these services on a systematic basis.8 
 
Some assistance to landmine survivors is provided by ICRC (via the Ethiopian Red 
Cross and through a number of government and private prosthetic and orthopaedic 
centres), while Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) runs a small peer-to-peer 
assistance programme within Addis Ababa. 
 
Ethiopia ratified the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in late 2004, but 
has not yet provided an account of its stockpiles or its plans for destroying these as 
required by Article 7 of the Convention. 
 
NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project 
 
NPA rapidly got the MDD component underway, and has been extremely effective in 
accrediting its dogs and training local handlers nominated by EMAO.9 The production 
rates of the MDD teams are excellent given the high quality/safety approach 
employed by NPA and recently endorsed by EMAO. The mobile MDD base in 
Gemhalo is well operated. The start-up for the national MDD training centre was 
delayed some months, but construction was making good progress by the time of the 
evaluation mission. 
 
The start-up of the Technical Survey component was delayed due to difficulty in 
recruiting a qualified Operations Manager, but NPA took appropriate steps to prepare 
an initial draft of an SOP for Technical Survey, avoiding unnecessary slippage. The 
incumbent Operations Manager arrived a few weeks prior to the Evaluation Team’s 
mission, and he appears to be suitably qualified and highly experienced.  
 
                                                
6 The Evaluation Team did not receive a copy of the draft strategy – only a presentation summary. 
7 The Bureau for Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA) in Tigray, and the Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (DPPFSB) in Afar.  
8 RaDO continues to provide some MRE within Sudanese refugee camps in western Ethiopia. 
9 EMAO has nominated very well-qualified personnel. 
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Following a workshop in October 2006, EMAO agreed to proceed with field trials of 
the Technical Survey SOP proposed by NPA. A key issue is how much land now 
recorded as Suspected Hazard Area (SHA) can be released as Areas without Obvious 
Risk (AWOR) based on, first, general survey activities (i.e. analysis of all available 
data plus a visual inspection) and, second, intrusive investigations of remaining areas 
deemed ‘low risk’ using a combination of machines, MDD, or manual teams.10  
 
Prior to these trials, NPA will train five 10-person Technical Survey teams in the new 
SOP (including the use of MDD in support of Technical Survey). At the time of the 
evaluation mission, NPA was awaiting the assignment of personnel to the training 
course by EMAO. 
 
In the project design, Task Impact Assessment (TIA) was incorporated as an element 
of the Technical Survey component.11 NPA brought-in a TIA advisor from Sri Lanka 
to adapt the system for Ethiopia and to train EMAO staff (principally, their 
community liaison/MRE personnel, one of whom is attached to each of the demining 
companies). However, the approach used in Sri Lanka requires substantial adaptation 
to meet EMAO current requirements. In Sri Lanka, the TIA teams operate separately 
from, and well in advance of, the Technical Survey teams, and compile an inventory 
of potential benefits and beneficiaries for a number of mine-affected communities. 
Priorities are then established for the Technical Survey and clearance teams based on 
this inventory of socio-economic benefits. Conversely, EMAO has been working on 
contracts which incorporate a clear set of priorities, broadly established (i.e. to the 
sub-district or kebele level) by the ERPMU and the regional governments in Tigray 
and Afar.  
 
More generally, the Federal Government has been pursuing a decentralisation 
programme for a decade. In at least those regions where decentralised government/ 
administrative structures are well established (as in Tigray), this structure should be 
used to set local priorities, following criteria set at the national and regional levels 
(with validation by EMAO to ensure the identified priorities comply with the criteria).  
 
Conclusions and Principal Recommendations 
 
EMAO is a large demining organisation, with growing capabilities, that has 
performed increasingly well since its establishment. Its demining operations have 
made a substantial contribution to the resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the 
war-affected districts (woredas) of Tigray and Afar, delivering significant socio-
economic benefits for those regions and promoting Ethiopia’s post-war recovery. 
 
NPA assistance is well targeted and relevant to EMAO’s existing and future needs. 
While NPA has experienced some start-up problems, it has been able to manage these 
to control slippage. It seems likely that the project will achieve its principal objectives 
by the end of 2007. A question that is not yet fully resolved, however, is how to adapt 
the TIA model to meet Ethiopia’s requirements. 
 
                                                
10 Currently, EMAP Technical Survey teams release some land based on the general survey analysis, 
but then the remaining area – both low and high risk portions – is fully cleared. 
11 NPA uses TIA to ensure that expensive clearance assets are assigned only to tasks that are likely to 
deliver worthwhile socio-economic benefits to appropriate beneficiaries without undue delay. 
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Recommendation 12 (p. 49) – NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a 
review of the development planning and management systems in place in Ethiopia, 
including future plans for decentralisation, to understand how to adapt the basic TIA 
approach in a manner that complements and reinforces local and regional government 
planning mechanisms. 
 
There have been instances (most notably concerning the importation of project 
vehicles) where closer cooperation between NPA and EMAO could have saved time 
and money. More fundamentally, successful partnerships are based on mutual 
accountability to promote shared objectives. This is particularly true for capacity 
development projects, where the international agency can only support the efforts of 
the local partner. Regular meetings could foster this degree of cooperation, strengthen 
the sense of mutual accountability, and help ensure the project achieves its targets. 
 
Recommendation 13 (p. 50) – EMAO and NPA should institute a system of regular 
meetings between the EMAO Director General and NPA’s Mine Action Programme 
Manager to discuss their joint work programme, review progress, identify problems, 
and agree on steps to resolve these problems. Action minutes should be taken to 
document any changes to plans and the commitments made by either party. 
 
While EMAO is the pre-eminent mine action organisation in Ethiopia, its legal 
authority is ambiguous in critical areas and it does not see its mandate covering all 
mine action pillars, such as stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the 
transparency obligations of a State Party to the APMBC. As such, the institutional 
make-up for mine action in Ethiopia is deficient. EMAO management recognises this 
deficiency and has recommended in its corporate strategic plan (not yet adopted by 
the Government) that its mandate be enhanced to include responsibility and authority: 
 
• for quality assurance and certification; 
• for control, coordination, accreditation and licensing; 
• as the national focal point for any mine-action related affairs; and 
• to negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements. 
 
The Evaluation Team endorses EMAO’s recommendation as an interim measure, and 
recommends these additions: 
 
Recommendation 14 (p. 51) – In addition to the modifications recommended by EMAO 
in its corporate strategic plan, a new decree should: 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for preparing for approval by the Council 
of Ministers a national mine action strategy encompassing demining, MRE, 
stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of 
the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention; 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining the national mine action 
database, and for providing relevant mine action data to organisations 
responsible for the provision of development investments and the delivery of 
public services in mine-contaminated regions of Ethiopia; 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining a national registry of 
landmine victims and a national surveillance system for recording accidents 
from landmines and other explosive remnants of war; 
• designate which ministries hold the lead responsibility for ensuring Ethiopia 
meets its various obligations as a State Party to the APMBC, including those 
for stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and transparency; 
• provide for each of the lead ministries to be represented on the Board; 
• designate the EMAO Board as the National Mine Action Authority. 
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In preparation for a new decree, steps should be taken to consult with ministries 
whose support will be needed if Ethiopia is to meet its Treaty obligations. 
 
Recommendation 4 (p. 40) – The Board of EMAO should convene a meeting of 
representatives from the relevant ministries, including at least the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and Legal Affairs to review 
Ethiopia’s obligations with respect to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to 
initiate a process to prepare its initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of 
the APMBC. 
 
EMAO, with the assistance of the UNDP MAAT, has done a good job in resource 
mobilisation to date. However, the ending of the World Bank-financed ERP means 
more attention is needed to mobilise resources from multiple donors. A common 
feature in the institutional make-up of donor-dependent mine action programmes is a 
formal mechanism for periodic meetings with donors. 
 
Recommendation 15 (p. 52) – EMAO and its Board should formally establish, with the 
support of UNDP, a Donor Support Group for the national mine action programme, with 
semi-annual meetings chaired by the Chair of the EMAO Board or the representative 
from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). 
 
Ethiopia has an effective demining programme, currently geared to the needs in 
Tigray and Afar for clearance of ‘classic’ minefields in the mine belt near the border 
with Eritrea. EMAO has not to date, however, formulated a strategy for a national 
mine action programme (i.e. one that covers the country’s entire contamination 
problem and all actors involved, directly or indirectly, in all components of mine 
action) that fully addresses a number of strategic issues on the horizon, including: 
 
• the transition from World Bank loan financing to multi-donor grant financing; 
• transition from a focus on war-affected areas along the Eritrean border to a 
nation-wide programme; 
• shift from working on large minefields within a well-defined mine belt, to 
more varied and dispersed contamination problems, both large and small; 
• the need to assess MRE requirements throughout the country and the 
challenge of meeting the needs identified; 
• the need to address a range of Treaty obligations, including victim assistance, 
stockpile destruction, and transparency reporting; 
• the danger of renewed conflict with neighbouring countries. 
 
Given the tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and the instability in 
some of the neighbouring countries, some careful thought about disaster preparedness 
is also warranted. In addition, now that additional financing from the World Bank 
ERP loan is unavailable, EMAO will need to make a new case for funding from the 
Federal Government, which should be based on evidence which demonstrates how 
mine action promotes the country’s development priorities, such as food security and 
the expansion of the infrastructure system to reach more rural people. 
 
It is clear that the Director General of EMAO has thought about many of these issues, 
and the new corporate strategy submitted for government approval provides a good 
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platform for the analysis of the range of strategic issues in a systematic fashion to 
formulate a strategy for the overall national mine action programme. 
 
Recommendation 16 (p. 54) – EMAO should initiate a strategic planning process, using 
its corporate strategy and the findings from the ELIS as a base, to examine the full 
range of strategic issues on the horizon and with a view to formulating a strategy for a 
national mine action programme. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2005, with the agreement of the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) and the 
financial support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RNMFA) and 
the Government of Finland, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) initiated a project 
designed to enhance EMAO Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) and Technical Survey/Task 
Impact Assessment (TIA) capacities. These enhanced capacities would then 
contribute to broader development objectives: (i) the reduction in mine and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) accidents, and (ii) safe settlement and access to land for 
target groups (particularly the displaced people and other vulnerable groups in Tigray 
and Afar regions, where the bulk of EMAO assets are based). 
 
The grant agreement with the RNMFA specified that a mid-term evaluation of the 
NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project be conducted, in part to inform a decision on 
whether additional assistance would be provided to this or a modified project. NPA 
contacted the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD or the 
Centre) in early 2006 to see if it wished to conduct the evaluation. The GICHD 
expressed interest, but recommended the scope of the exercise be expanded to review 
Ethiopia’s mine action programme as a whole, as well as the contribution of mine 
action to the country’s development. This would allow a better assessment of the NPA 
project and allow EMAO – NPA’s partner in the project – to ensure that the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) for the exercise incorporated issues which it wished to have 
reviewed. Informal discussions with the EMAO Director General during July 2006 in 
Geneva confirmed a consensus to undertake this broader review.  
 
Subsequently, the GICHD prepared a draft TOR and submitted this to both NPA and 
EMAO. After some iteration, the final TOR was agreed.12 The scope of the exercise 
was to: 
 
• evaluate the assistance provided by NPA to support the development of EMAO 
capacities in MDD and technical survey (incorporating TIA); 
• evaluate the effect of NPA assistance on EMAO’s capacity to plan and manage 
integrated demining operations using MDD, machines, and manual demining 
teams; 
• review the role EMAO plays within Ethiopia’s national mine action effort; and 
• review the contribution of the national mine action programme toward Ethiopia’s 
development, and efforts made to enhance the alignment between mine action and 
development priorities. 
 
While the exercise was to promote accountability – (i) of NPA to both EMAO and 
RNMFA, and (ii) of EMAO both to national authorities and other agencies providing 
financial support – it was agreed the emphasis should be on learning from: 
 
• NPA experience in implementing its project 
• EMAO experience in planning and implementing integrated demining operations 
                                                
12 Appendix 1 contains the TOR.  
  Evaluation of NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project & 
  Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
February 2007  Page 2  
• EMAO and mine action partner experiences in aligning mine action with 
development priorities. 




The mission to Ethiopia began on 14 October. Broadly, the Review Team was divided 
into two, with Tim Lardner from the GICHD focussing on the operational and 
technical aspects of the demining programme, while Ted Paterson (GICHD) and 
Senait Seyoum from the Forum for Social Studies (FSS) examined the overall mine 
action programme and its links to broader development objectives. In addition to 
reviewing documents and conducting interviews in Addis Ababa, team members 
travelled to Gemhalo in Tigray (the major base of operations for both EMAO and 
NPA) to observe demining operations and to Mekele (capital of Tigray) to interview 
officials and conduct visits to formerly mine-affected communities as far as the 
Eritrean border. 
 
During the second week of the mission, the UNDP Regional Mine Action Advisor 
(Archie Law) was in Addis Ababa conducting a review of capacity development 
support provided to EMAO by the UNDP Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT). The 
Review Team benefited greatly from an exchange of information and views with Mr. 
Law, and recommends that, when opportunities arise, missions from different mine 
action agencies be coordinated in this fashion, both to benefit from information 
exchange and to reduce the time demands on mine action officials and practitioners. 
 
The mission ended on 2 November, on which day the Review Team presented its 
preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations in a debriefing to officials at 
the EMAO (attended by representatives from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, NPA, 
and others). 
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• Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of Ethiopia’s socio-economic features, the 
history of conflict and political developments, and the nature and scope of 
landmine and UXO contamination; 
• Chapter 2 summarises some of the key features of development planning and 
management in Ethiopia (with some detail provided in Appendix 4); 
• Chapter 3 presents a history and analysis of the Ethiopian national mine action 
programme; 
• Chapter 4 describes and analyses NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project; 
• Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations. 
 
In some cases, the recommendations do not fully specify how they are to be 
implemented (e.g. which agencies are responsible for doing what and when) and the 
set of recommendations are not sequenced into a road map. This is purposeful, as the 
intention is to follow-up with a stakeholders’ workshop in early 2007 to review the 
recommendations, modify these where warranted, and formulate a preliminary 
implementation plan. 
 
Appendixes contain the Terms of Reference, the itinerary and list of people met, a 
timeline giving milestones in Ethiopia’s mine action programme, further details on 
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1.  Background 
1.1  Ethiopia’s society and economy 
Ethiopia is a large and ethnically diverse country, with the second largest population 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – over 70 million. Most (85%) are rural,13 heavily-
dependent on rainfall,14 and very poor,15 with 44% of the population falling below the 
basic needs poverty line in 2000. In recent years, there have been improvements in 
wellbeing indicators stemming from decentralisation of responsibilities for the 
provision of basic public services coupled with an increase in the proportion of pre-
poor spending from 39% of the budget in 1999/2000 to 54% in 2005/06. However, 
levels of human and physical capital remain low even by SSA standards, and Ethiopia 
ranks 170 of 177 countries in the Human Development Index for 2006. 
 
Table 1 – Socio-economic statistics: Ethiopia and sub-Saharan Africa 
 Ethiopia Average – SSA 
Gross National Income per capita $100 $430 
GDP (PPP) $810 $1826 
Life expectancy (years) 42 47 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 98 92 
Under-nourishment (% of pop.) 44% 33% 
Access to potable water 24% 58% 
Irrigated land (% of cropland) 2% 4% 
Road density (km/1000km
2
) 27 50 
Electrical power consumption (kwh p.c.) 22 432 
Urban population (% of total) 17% 37% 
Households owning a radio 13% 44% 
 
The structure of the economy has remained remarkably unchanged, with agriculture 
accounting for over 40% of GDP. Because of this, economic growth is driven 
principally by the performance of the agricultural sector. After a disastrous period 
caused by droughts and conflicts in the 1980s, growth accelerated to an average of 
4.4% in the 1990s. But the economy plummeted by -3.8% in 2003 because of another 
drought, illustrating the vulnerability of the economy and the millions of people 
dependent on good rains for crop and livestock production.  
 
Ethiopia is also hampered by weak capacity. Consultations leading to the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP – Ethiopia’s initial Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper) highlighted widespread discontent with the level and 
quality of public service delivery. The private sector is also weak, in part because of 
the policies adopted in the 1980s by the socialist Derg regime. Exports are based on 
agricultural, and highly concentrated in a few commodities such as coffee, for which 
world prices have been falling. 
 
                                                
13 Eighty-five percent of the rural population has been continuously residing in the woreda they were 
born in. 
14 More households report drought as the worst shock they have experienced, than report death of the 
household head or a spouse. Only 5% of potentially irrigated land is now irrigated. 
15 The main income source for 87% of rural households is subsistence agriculture, and 7 or 8 million 
people are chronically food insecure, unable to feed themselves for more than six months even in the 
absence of drought.  
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The current government, which assumed power in 1991, is well aware that Ethiopia 
needs substantial investment, particularly infrastructure such as roads and electricity 
to enhance productivity and economic growth.16 With substantial international 
assistance to augment its own resources, the government markedly expanded 
infrastructure investment in the 1990s (the road network grew by 75% overall, and 
rural roads almost tripled). However, growing tensions with Eritrea and the 1998-
2000 border war led to the destruction of infrastructure and a diversion of government 
resources from productive investment to defence.17 Donor assistance also fell, as it did 
after the controversial 2005 elections. 
1.2  Conflict and politics 
Ethiopians are proud of their long history of independence. Ethiopia is the only sub-
Saharan African country that has not been colonised, except for a brief period (1936-
41) following the Italian invasion that presaged the Second World War.  
 
Following the expulsion of the Italians, there were no significant conflicts during 
much of the long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. Since 1970 however, Ethiopia has 
been beset by crisis, with a severe famine in 1973-74 leading to an intensification and 
ultimate success of a civil war against Haile Selassie.18 Following the Emperor’s 
overthrow in 1974, a Marxist regime (the Derg) assumed power and, three years later, 
Somalia invaded to initiate the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Somalia occupied a large 
portion of Ethiopian territory for a period, and landmines were laid throughout the 
occupied areas, along much of the Ethiopia/Somalia border, and on all main roads.  
 
Conflicts continued throughout most of the 1980s, with a border war with Sudan at 
the beginning of the decade, an intensifying war for independence in Eritrea, and 
more widespread civil conflict culminating in the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, at 
which point Ethiopia recognised Eritrea’s independence. After a period of relative 
calm, border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea led in May 1998 to open war. The 
conflict was characterized by trench warfare with relatively short periods of heavy 
fighting resulting in significant casualties. On 18 June 2000, the two governments 
signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. 
Textbox 1 – The socio-economic impact of the war with Eritrea 
In addition to military casualties and the economic cost of conducting the war, about 330,000 
civilians were displaced in Tigray and another 34,000 in Afar. Following the cessation of 
conflict, many civilians returned to their communities, but an estimated 50% remained 
internally displaced, unable to return to their homes due to the presence of landmines/UXO, 
the proximity of Eritrean forces, or because their homes, water supply, or other essential 
resources and infrastructure were damaged or destroyed.  
 
As well, an estimated 76,000 persons of Ethiopian origin who had been residing in Eritrea 
returned or were deported, with another 33,000 expected to come into Ethiopia in the near 
future, bringing the total number of deportees/returnees to about 110,000. The overwhelming 
majority of these were women, children, and the elderly who arrived with no means of 
supporting themselves. 
                                                
16 Road density is one-fifth the average for similarly low-income countries, and electricity consumption 
one-thirtieth! Households are on average 10 kilometers away from a dry weather road. 
17 Expenditures on defence shot-up from 2% in fiscal year 1996/97, to over 13% in FY 1999/2000. 
18 One of the enduring images that fuelled discontent was of the Emperor’s dogs, who remained well-
fed while thousands people were dying of hunger during the famine. Undoubtedly, this is a factor in the 
resistance of EMAO to expend any of its own resources on Mine Detection Dogs. 
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Further, an estimated 36,000 civilian war casualties (including militia) were bread winners, 
leaving their families (about 144,000 people) on the verge of destitution. 
 
The war also caused widespread destruction that led to the loss of employment for many non-
rural people, and ended cross-border trade, which previously made up a significant portion of 
the local economy in border areas and included sales of livestock, vegetables, spices, etc. – 
this in a chronically drought affected region where poor rains during the 1999 meher (main 
harvest) season led to significant reductions in crop production.* Even those who returned to 
their farming communities (some without official sanction) found their lands contaminated by 
landmines and UXO. This lead to a sharp rise in victims to an estimated 400 in 2002, 65% of 
whom were children.  
 
* Even under normal conditions, average land holdings in Tigray are insufficient to support farm 
households for more than six months. Seasonal migration to find employment in Eritrea, Saudi Arabia 
and other parts of Ethiopia is traditional, but the conflict with Eritrea curbed this significantly. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2000, Technical Annex: Emergency Recovery Program; EU, 2003, Mission Report. 
 
Subsequently, both sides agreed ex ante to abide by the decision of the Ethiopia-
Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC), established by the United Nations. However, 
Ethiopia has not implemented the April 2002 EEBC ruling that required it to 
withdraw from the town of Badme, which was awarded to Eritrea. In November 2004, 
Ethiopia recognised the ruling of the Border Commission “in principle”. However, the 
Government still seeks dialogue with Eritrea on its implementation while Eritrea calls 
for immediate, unconditional implementation of the ruling. Tensions remain high, 
with allegations that Eritrea and Ethiopia are actively supporting different factions in 
Somalia, and reports during the course of this mission that Eritrea has moved troops 
and tanks into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) monitored by UN peacekeeping 
troops from the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). 
Political developments  
The 1991 overthrow of the Derg had been accomplished by a number of regional 
movements, and the government established by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) represented a coalition of these, with the Tigray Peoples 
Liberation Front (TPLF) being dominant. The new government adopted a 
development strategy of balanced regional progress based on participatory 
development. It embarked on a bold process of decentralisation, supported by large 
transfers of untied resources from the federal government to the regions.  
 
In May 2005, the first openly contested elections in Ethiopia’s history were held. 
During open public debates with opposition parties preceding the election, the 
Government pledged its commitment to a clean process. Voting was peaceful 
according to international observers (the EU, the AU, and the Carter Center), with 
high participation. Official results showed the ruling EPRDF retaining a majority in 
Parliament, while the opposition increased its seats and gained control of the Addis 
Ababa city government. However, the international monitors reported the elections 
did not conform to international standards and the opposition disputes the result. 
 
Election-related violence began in June 2005. Many members of the largest 
opposition party boycotted Parliament. In November, clashes occurred between 
civilians and government security forces in Addis Ababa and several other cities. 
Thousands of civilians were arrested, including journalists and key opposition leaders.  
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Since then, most of the opposition parliamentarians have taken their seats and there 
has been progress towards the formation of an opposition-led city government in 
Addis (which remains under a mayor appointed by the Federal Government). The 
Government had made a number of other accommodations (changing parliamentary 
rules intended to limit the power of the opposition and talk of easing media 
restrictions). However, key opposition leaders and journalists still remain jailed, and 
trials on treason charges began in February 2006.  
 
In summary, Ethiopia today faces continuing tensions, both internal and regional. This 
insecurity undoubtedly conditions many government attitudes and decisions. 
1.3  Nature and scope of the contamination 
Two main data sets exist on the landmine and UXO contamination in Ethiopia. In 
2001, HALO Trust conducted a survey of ‘dangerous areas’ in Tigray and Afar.19 
Shortly thereafter, NPA began implementing a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) to 
provide a nationwide assessment of the contamination problem, in part to provide a 
basis for the formulation of a national mine action strategy. 
Textbox 2 – Types of Surveys in Mine Action 
There is great confusion relating to the types of surveys utilised in the mine action field. They 
can be categorised by scope (broad or single task) and focus (explosive hazards or socio-
economic impacts). Within each category, surveys can analyse the data by individual 
demining task or by community (i.e. embracing all the suspected hazard areas [SHA] affecting 
a community). Examples include: 
 
 Broad (i.e. covering all or a 
large region of a country) 
Single task (or cluster of tasks 
in the same area) 
Suspected hazard 
areas (SHA) 
• Level 1 or general survey 
(some – e.g. HALO Trust’s 
Dangerous Areas Survey) 
• Level 2 (task planning) survey 
• Technical survey 
• Level 3 (quality assurance) 
Socio-economic • General survey (some) 
• LIS** 
• (broad) Post-clearance land 
use survey 
• Landmines & livelihoods 
survey (Yemen)** 
• Level 4 (post-clearance land 
use) 
• Task Impact Assessment (TIA) 
for single tasks  
• TIA for community (Sri 
Lanka)** 
• Community Integrated Mine 
Action Planning (Bosnia)** 
** Community survey (as opposed to task survey) 
 
Different surveys serve different purposes. Broad surveys are required to get an overview of 
the scope and nature of contamination in a country at a particular point in time. These are 
typically commissioned during an emergency (e.g. when masses of refugees are returning 
following a peace agreement) or as a prelude to the development of a national mine action 
strategy, when important resource allocation decisions must be made (e.g. the quantity and 
mix of demining assets, and the allocation of demining assets across affected regions). In 
such instances, time is of the essence, so a big survey is done on a campaign basis. Because 
the intent is to get the ‘big picture’ in short order, not enough data on SHA or communities are 
collected for operational tasking of demining assets. 
 
Thus, mine action programmes also need the capacity to conduct on-going surveys for 
                                                
19 This was never fully completed because of restrictions on the disclosure of data and difficulties in 
obtaining complete and accurate minefield maps. 
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detailed assessments of specific demining tasks or the requirements of a specific mine-
affected community. These surveys will eventually cover all communities and SHA on a rolling 
basis over a period of years. 
 
In short, while there are overlaps in the data collected in the different survey categories, they 
serve complementary purposes. We need both the big picture to allocate resources and 
detailed information to establish priorities for specific tasks. We need technical data to ensure 
the right quantity and mix of demining assets are assigned to a specific task, and socio-
economic data to assess which tasks will deliver the greatest benefits and, therefore, should 
be accorded priority. 
 
The LIS found that almost two million people in 1,492 communities were affected by 
contamination (about 3% of the population and 10% of all communities in Ethiopia). 
Approximately 10% of these communities were heavily impacted, 21% medium-
impacted, and 69% low impacted. The most heavily impacted regions were Afar, 
Somali, and Tigray. Most of the communities were small (50 to 550 households) – 
either compact farming villages or dispersed communities of pastoralists.20 Almost 
half the communities (700+) were affected by landmines and UXO stemming from 
1976-80 (i.e. the Ogaden War with Somalia, plus civil conflict against the Derg), 
while about 200 were affected by mines laid during the war with Eritrea. 
Textbox 3 – The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) 
The ELIS was implemented by NPA, with oversight by EMAO, the Survey Action Center 
(SAC) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), over 2½ years (2001-2004). NPA 
employed the internationally-recognised protocols established by the Survey Working Group. 
The ELIS cost over $4 million, including $800,000 in equipment left with EMAO. 
 
Of almost 15,000 communities in Ethiopia, the survey found 1,492 (10%) were impacted, 
spread through 10 of the 11 regions, with 82% of the impacted communities in the northern 
and eastern parts of the country (Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions). Communities were 
affected by from one to seven suspected hazard areas (SHA). Only 49 communities (3%) 
reported that some mine clearance had taken place. 
 
In a parallel initiative, SAC contracted Cranfield Mine Action to undertake three missions to 
facilitate strategic planning, which eventually contributed to the recent submission of a draft 
Five Year Strategic Plan covering 2006/07 to 2011/12. 
 
Unsurprisingly, most of the 1,300 recent victims21 were farming, herding, or 
travelling when the accident occurred, with the vast majority of victims (82%) being 
male. Approximately 30% of the surviving victims received some sort of emergency 
care. Very few have received subsequent physical rehabilitation or vocational therapy. 
Regardless, a large percentage of survivors are engaged in some sort of productive 
work (e.g. herding, farming, domestic work). 
 
The graph on the following page depicts the principal asset blockages. As well, 
pastoralist communities reported the loss of large numbers of livestock. 
 
The nature of the contamination differs significantly across regions. Close to the 
border with Eritrea Tigray and Afar regions, most of the minefields are ‘classic’ 
                                                
20 A separate questionnaire for pastoralists was used to gather data not only on a nomadic group’s base 
area (i.e., the specific community with which it is officially affiliated), but also on watering points and 
grazing areas, and the migratory routes used to reach those strategic resources. 
21 Recent means within two years from the time a community was surveyed. The survey found a further 
15,321 victims before 2002. 
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defensive fields with many anti-personnel landmines along the line of trenches, which 
stretches for hundreds of kilometres. After the cessation of hostilities,22 the Ethiopian 
army conducted clearance operations to ‘lift’ landmines, but this did not conform to 
international standards and a number of landmines, plus significant UXO, remain.23 In 
this area many of the minefields are littered with shrapnel, complicating manual 
clearance operations which rely largely on metal detectors. Pastures and farmland are 
the most common blockages. 
 
Figure 2 – Percentages of communities reporting key blockages 









The pattern is very different in Somali region where most of the contamination stems 
from the Ogaden War in the 1970s, which featured mechanised warfare over a vast 
theatre of operations. Anti-tank mines are far more common than elsewhere in 
Ethiopia, and local trails and paths are the most commonly reported blockage. 
 
The next most contaminated region is Oromiya, where the contamination stems 
principally from the Italian invasion and the civil war to overthrow the Derg. A 
smaller proportion of the affected communities are classified as high or medium 
impact. Pasture and rain-fed crop land were the two principal blockages reported. 
 
The prevalence of contamination, and its impacts on communities, are far more 
modest in the rest of the country, except (perhaps) parts of Gambella, which the ELIS 
could not adequately survey due to insecurity. 
Textbox 4 – Impact scoring for the ELIS 
While remaining compliant with international protocols agreed for the LIS, the impact scoring 
system used in Ethiopia differed in some ways from that employed for previous surveys. For 
an LIS, community impact scores are the sum of three categories of indicators: recent victims; 
the presence of landmines and UXO; and socio-economic blockages. 
 
As with other surveys, the number of recent victims is the most significant factor, with 2 points 
added for each recent victim in a community. The ELIS also gave 2 points for the presence of 
                                                
22 The 18 June 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities specified the following undertakings for 
both Ethiopia and Eritrea: …both parties shall conduct demining activities as soon as possible with a 
view to creating the conditions necessary for the deployment of the Peacekeeping Mission, the return of 
civilian administration and the return of the population…” 
23 In addition, the army cleared roads for their own operational requirements, which has also allowed 
road and power line rehabilitation financed by the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme. 
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landmines and 1 point for UXO (consistent with other surveys). 
 
It is in the socio-economic blockages category that the ELIS is innovative. Previous impact 
scoring exercises used a simple list of socio-economic assets (irrigated crop land, rain-fed 
cropland, potable water sources, etc.) adding to a maximum of 10 points. For the ELIS, 
EMAO decided on the following system, featuring asset categories, with maximum scoring 
limits for each category (also summing to a maximum of 10): 
 
Category/Asset Score Max for category 
Cropland 
 Irrigated 2 
 Rain-fed growing fruit, trees, and other 
perennials 
2 
 Rain-fed growing grains, pulses, vegetables, or 
other seasonal crops 
1 
Maximum 3 for 
cropland 
Water 
 Drinking/potable water source 2 
 Source of water for all other uses 1 
Maximum 2 for water 
Other assets 
 Pastureland/foraging land 1 
 Wood foraging land 1 
 Roads 1 
 Housing area 1 
 Buildings and facilities 1 




In summary, Ethiopia is one of the most mine-affected countries in Africa and the 
world, with extensive contamination representing – in the various regions – very 
different challenges for both demining and mine risk education (MRE). It also has a 
large number of landmine survivors, with more accidents occurring regularly. 
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2.  Summary of Development Management in Ethiopia 
2.1  Background 
 
To link effectively with development efforts, mine action officials and advisors need 
to understand the development planning, management, and financing mechanisms in 
their country, including: 
 
Which decisions are made where, and by whom – Countries allocate responsibility 
for public service delivery and the implementation of investment programmes in 
different ways. The main divisions of authorities generally are defined in the 
constitution. Most mine action programmes find they need to deal with various 
different central-level ministries, and one-or-more sub-national governments or 
administrations.24 If mine action officials and advisors do not understand how 
authorities are divided across ministries and among government levels, they will be 
frustrated when they seek decisions from officials who are not empowered to make 
that decision. Just as critically, they also may fail to obtain information from officials 
who are best placed to guide the priority-setting process. 
 
How decisions concerning financial resource allocations are made – Public 
expenditure management systems generally comprise a variety of mechanisms for the 
allocation of resources over the long-, medium-, and short-term. The most critical is 
the annual budget authorising expenditures for designated purposes in the coming 
year. But it is unlikely poor countries will be able to find adequate resources in the 
short-term from their own sources to sustain the essential components of a mine 
action programme. Loans to governments from development banks also take years to 
put in place. Thus, mine action officials and advisors need to start the process of 
obtaining budget allocations even when donor support appears adequate for the 
coming few years. To do so requires understanding not only the budget, but also the 
long- and medium-term expenditure planning and management mechanisms. 
 
When budget decisions are made – Countries establish budget calendars for their 
annual budget cycle (planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation). If a national 
mine action programme is to receive funds through the government budget, it has to 
be well prepared at each milestone in the annual budget calendar. Eventually, 
programmes will need to adopt the national budget calendar for their annual planning 
purposes rather than to those imposed by various donors. 
 
Aid modalities – International aid can be delivered in a variety ‘modalities’, 
including: 
• discrete projects,  
• ‘common pool’ contributions by many donors to a national programme,  
• ‘earmarked’ contributions to the government treasury, and  
• direct budget support, which is not earmarked for specific projects or 
programmes. 
 
                                                
24 Governments have their own authorities to enact laws, and often are elected. Administrations do not 
have distinct authority to pass laws – their powers are delegated from a higher level. 
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The modalities toward the top of the list are less risky for donors in terms of the 
likelihood for misappropriation of their funds, and give greater opportunities for 
‘showing the flag’ to claim credit for the project or programme. But the proliferation 
of donors makes it impossible for the recipient government to formulate a 
development strategy for the country or a key sector, while the fragmentation of aid 
into many distinct projects overwhelms administrative capacities of the local 
government. Both types of proliferation lead to ‘institutional destruction’ rather than 
capacity development – a process that has been well known and documented for over 
20 years.25 
 
Textbox 5 – Reforming the aid system 
In recognition that a proliferation of donors and projects is no way to help a country, most 
donors have adopted policies designed to enhance aid effectiveness,* based on the following 
principles: 
 
• Ownership – Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions 
• Alignment – Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures 
• Harmonisation – Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective 
• Managing for results – Managing resources and improving decision-making for 
results 
• Mutual accountability – Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
 
This has important implications for mine action programmes, the most important being that, in 
countries where the development effort is improving, there will be a progression from a 
situation of (i) no overall strategy and multiple decision makers toward (ii) a single national 
strategy and single resource allocation process (i.e. the national budgetary process). Even in 
well-managed countries, this process will take years, but the direction is clear.** In Ethiopia, 
many donors have joined the Development Assistance Group (DAG), which works with the 
government to advance the aid effectiveness agenda.*** 
 
* Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual 
Accountability, 2005. 
** Government of Ethiopia, 2002, Partnership for Enhanced Aid Delivery to Ethiopia 
*** See <www.dagethiopia.org/DAGStructuring.aspx>  
2.2  Key Features26 
 
Division of authority – Ethiopia is a federal state, with five levels of public 
administration: 
 
• Federal government 
• Regional government 
• Zonal administration 
• Woreda government 
• Kebele or (in rural areas) Farmer/Pastoralist Associations 
 
                                                
25 Morss, Elliot, 1984, Institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation in Sub-
Saharan African countries, World Development, 12:4 
26 Further details are provided in Appendix 4. 
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The current government has initiated two waves of decentralisation; the first (starting 
in the mid-1990s) transferred significant expenditure responsibilities to the regional 
governments, and the second (starting in 2002) transferring many regional 
responsibilities to woredas. As a result, many of the decisions that mine action 
personnel require from other government agencies to establish priorities (e.g. with 
respect to land use, resettlement schemes, local development plans, etc.) are now the 
responsibility of regional or woreda governments.27 Given this governance structure, 
it is vital that the mine action programme establishes strong links with government 
officials at the regional level and below. 
 
As in most countries that are pursuing a policy of decentralisation, there is a fiscal 
imbalance in Ethiopia. Most expenditures are the responsibility of sub-national 
governments, but 85% of all revenues are collected by the Federal Government. To 
address this imbalance, the Federal Government provides significant unconditional 
grants to the regions, which then provide similar grants to woredas. 
 
The ‘offset’ is an important feature in the current system for unconditional grants. 
Basically, if the Federal Government is aware of aid funds flowing directly to a 
regional government, it offsets (i.e. deducts) 100% of that amount from its 
unconditional grant to that region. This is a strong disincentive for a Regional 
Government to seek aid directly from donors, as the unconditional grant will be 
reduced by an equal amount, without an allowance even to cover the transaction costs 
of negotiating the grant and reporting to the donor. 
 
Mine action donors need to be consider the ‘offset’ in any plans to support the transfer 
of responsibilities (e.g. from the national government or NGOs) to regional 
governments. The regional governments may be unwilling to accept the new 
responsibilities – even when funding assistance is available – because the Federal 
Government will reduce the annual unconditional grant by an equal amount. 
 
To illustrate the issue, consider the efforts by UNICEF to transfer responsibilities for 
MRE to the regional governments in Tigray and Afar.28 If the Federal Government 
offsets any grant provided by UNICEF directly to the regional governments, those 
regions will be worse off, assuming a new responsibility with no additional resources. 
 
Recommendation 1 
Mine action donors should be careful when supporting the transfer of responsibilities 
to regional governments, even when the donor is willing to provide financial 
assistance, because the ‘offset’ policy could leave the regional government with 




Like many other countries in Africa, Ethiopia has a number of reforms underway to 
strengthen public financial management, including the introduction of a Macro 
Economic and Fiscal Framework (MEFF) and a rolling Public Expenditure 
Programme – both providing three-year forecasts to facilitate medium-term planning. 
                                                
27 Further details on the allocation of expenditure responsibilities are provided in Appendix 5. 
28 This is discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.5 in the next chapter. 
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It is important to note, however, that budget execution has been relatively disciplined, 
with low levels of corruption relative to many other countries in the region, and no 
significant expenditure arrears. 
 
The Federal Government has made significant financial contributions to the national 
mine action programme, financed principally from a soft-loan from the World Bank 
for the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme. The Federal Government provided 
some start-up funding for EMAO (e.g. salary repayments to a number of ministries 
which had staff seconded to the start-up task force that designed EMAO, drafted the 
decree, etc.). The Government continues to make an annual budget provision of 17-20 
million birr ($2+ million) for ‘contingencies’ (i.e. not spent unless required). For the 
most part, these budgeted funds have not been spent and, in E.C. 1998 (i.e. 2005-06), 
EMAO repaid over 11.5 million birr ($1.35 million) to the treasury for disbursements 
made by the Federal Government from 2002 to 2005. 
 
Textbox 6 – Funding mine action in Ethiopia  
Ethiopia has had an unusual pattern of funding for mine action to date. After receiving training 
and equipment support via the U.S. Ministry of Defense, the government financed the 
operations of the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) for over two years. Following the war with 
Eritrea, the government obtained World Bank a loan that financed the bulk of demining for five 
years. Starting in 2007, most of the funds will be coming from donor grants.  
 
This is the precise opposite of the pattern seen in most poor countries, which begin with 
donor grants, then start using loan funds for demining in support of reconstruction and 
development projects, and (presumably, as few countries have made this transition fully) 
eventually finance mine action from their own sources of revenue. 
 
Although Ethiopia’s pattern has been reversed, and donor funding will enable EMAO to 
complete the bulk of the demining, it will again need to get funds through the government 
budget to complete demining its known minefields and address the residual risk. 
 
Development Planning and Management 
 
The Government of Ethiopia seeks to promote rapid, broad-based, and equitable 
growth, and has decided to adopt a market-led strategy. Because the vast majority of 
Ethiopians live in rural areas, equitable growth must be based on rural development. 
This will require massive investments in physical capital (roads, telecommunications, 
and public services actually reaching rural communities) and human capital (so 
people are able to take advantage of market-based opportunities). As development 
planners in Addis Ababa cannot know in detail what rural communities most need, the 
Federal Government has adopted a strong decentralisation programme which (in 
tandem to market-led growth and human capital development) is intended to empower 
the poor and expand the choices and control that people have over their lives. 
 
These strategic elements are reflected in the 2002 Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) – Ethiopia’s initial PRSP. The Government has 
been working on a ‘second generation’ PRSP, called the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) to run until 2011, but this has not 
yet been released. 
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Coordination with Other Development Actors 
 
Ethiopia has also been one of the pilot countries for work on improving donor 
practices, and has made significant progress towards coordinating assistance and 
harmonizing ODA flows. Until the 2005 elections, the donor community had been 
supportive, but recently the donors agreed among themselves to: (i) move away from 
direct budget support in favour of alternative instruments; (ii) reduce aid over time if 
governance does not improve; and (iii) focus on new governance programmes. 
 
The government tries to coordinate the work of the NGOs in the context of its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (the SDPRP, soon to be replaced by the PASDEP), with the 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) responsible for this down to 
the woreda level. In Tigray for example, the DPP Bureau monitors about 25 NGOs 
(three or four of these are international).  
 
Disaster Management & Related Issues 
 
DPPC also takes the lead role in coordinating the emergency responses to disasters. In 
Tigray, the DPP Bureau has also assumed responsibility for ‘resettlements’ such as 
the voluntary resettlements from the overcrowded highlands in Eastern Tigray to the 
lower areas in Western Tigray). This is important for mine action as the bulk of 
EMAO demining resources are now based in the Kefta Humera woreda in Western 
Tigray, to clear land for resettlements. 
 
Textbox 7 – Possible future conflict in Humera 
Growing pressure on land and other natural resources has been leading to conflicts between 
pastoralists and farmers throughout much of Africa, including Ethiopia. In many cases, 
governments promote voluntary resettlement of farmers onto grazing lands traditionally used 
by pastoralists. This promises to raise total food production and reduce food insecurity, 
because nomadic herders typically use the land for only a few months in a year. However, if 
the pastoralists have no alternative options for grazing livestock in those months, their 
livelihoods may become unviable. Often the solution proposed by governments is to 
encourage the pastoralists to settle and convert to crop farming – an option many pastoral 
communities find unacceptable. 
 
A number of groups have been working on dispute resolution measures to protect pastoralist 
livelihoods. In Somali region, the government has adopted policies to protect nomadic 
communities. In Tigray however, the Evaluation Team understands the Regional Government 
has not adopted such policies. 
 
EMAO currently has many of its assets in Humera, demining land traditionally used by 
pastoralists on which the government of Tigray is planning to resettle farmers. While this is in 
keeping with Ethiopia’s and Tigray’s food security policies, there is potential for future conflict 
unless measures are taken to protect the livelihoods of the pastoralist communities. 
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3.  The Ethiopian Mine Action Programme 
3.1  Overview 
An Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) was established in 1995 as a non-combatant 
unit of the Ministry of National Defence, distinct from the Army Corps of Engineers. 
The U.S. provided equipment and training assistance, and the deminers worked in a 
number of regions of Ethiopia, sometimes in support of infrastructure projects.  
 
In 1998, the UN conducted an assessment mission, but provided only advice and 
support for MRE because of the conflict with Eritrea. Following the June 2000 
ceasefire and the peace agreement that December, the government of Ethiopia invited 
the UN to provide further advice and assistance to revive the national mine action 
programme. The subsequent mission provided a number of recommendations in this 
regard, one of which was the establishment of a civilian mine action agency, outside 
the Ministry of Defence.29 In February 2001, the Council of Ministers established the 
Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) and, later that year, the UN fielded a Mine 
Action Advisory Team (MAAT). 
 
Even before the creation of EMAO, the Federal Government and the World Bank 
agreed a loan to help finance the Emergency Recovery Programme (ERP), designed 
to assist with household rehabilitation, road reconstruction, and humanitarian 
demining in war-affected areas. The Bank’s project design documents originally 
envisaged that demining would be undertaken by the Ethiopian Demining Project (i.e. 
the non-combat demining companies in the armed forces),30 but once EMAO was 
established, it assumed the implementation role for the demining component.31 
3.2  Institutional Make-up 
Legislation 
Ethiopia was among the first cohort of countries to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) on 3 December 1997; however, it did not ratify the Convention 
until 17 December 2004. It became a State Party on 1 June 2005. The Government 
has not enacted legislation to implement the treaty domestically. Thus, the only 
domestic legal instrument relating to mine action is the decree establishing the 
Ethiopian Mine Action Office. 
Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) 
EMAO was created as an autonomous statutory body by the Council of Ministers 
Regulation No. 70/2001 issued on 5 February 2001. Originally EMAO reported to the 
Office of the Prime Minister, but in a public sector reorganisation last year, 
responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Federal Affairs.32 
                                                
29 One reason the government agreed with this recommendation was the possibility of developing a 
demining capacity that eventually could compete for international work. 
30 World Bank policy does not preclude the use of military deminers, so long as these operate under 
civilian direction. 
31 Following the cessation of hostilities, the army rapidly demined most of the suspected minefields, 
but clearance was not to international standards and many mines were missed, leaving civilians at risk 
32 There is a possibility that responsibility will be transferred back to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
  Evaluation of NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project & 
  Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
February 2007  Page 20  
 
The decree states that EMAO’s objectives are to: 
 
• prevent landmines and UXO from causing death, injury, and damage to property; 
• destroy such explosives; and 
• provide MRE. 
 
Its responsibilities include: 
 
• survey and clearance; 
• MRE; 
• cooperation with agencies responsible for certifying the safety of cleared areas; 
• cooperation with domestic and foreign organizations in the mine action field; 
• other activities necessary to attain its objectives.  
 
To discharge these responsibilities, EMAO may establish offices anywhere in the 
country; own property, contract, sue and be sued; and charge for its services. 
 
There is no mention of any responsibility concerning victims and survivors, and the 
decree is silent or ambiguous on a number of issues that would, ideally, be covered 
(see textbox). The powers accorded to the Board fall short of what is expected for a 
National Authority for Mine Action, and the Office is not explicitly given the range of 
powers expected of a national Mine Action Centre (MAC), such as responsibilities to 
formulate a national Mine Action Strategy and annual plans; to certify clearance and 
accredit operators; to maintain the national repository of mine action data; and to 
coordinate other mine action organisations. 
  
It appears that the Government’s primary motivation at the time it established EMAO 
was to create a civilian agency that could implement the demining component of the 
ERP. The loan agreement with the World Bank had already been signed, specifying 
that the ERPMU had many of the responsibilities normally vested in a national mine 
action authority and MAC (discussed below), so the decree establishing EMAO was 
written to be consistent with the loan agreement. Regardless, EMAO has functioned 
as the de facto ‘focal point’ for demining activities.33 
EMAO BOARD 
The Board comprises members appointed by the government from among ‘pertinent 
institutions and public bodies’. Currently, it has seven members: 
 
• the former Minister of Defence (recently appointed as the President of Oromiya 
Region) serves as chairman, plus representatives of the ministries of 
• Defence,  
• Finance and Economic Development (the Manager for the Mine Action 
component of the ERP),  
• Transportation,  
• Communications, and  
• Foreign Affairs, as well as the   
                                                
33 Demining embraces survey, marking, and clearance. 
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• Director General of EMAO. 
 
In addition to general oversight of EMAO, the Board’s powers and duties are to issue 
administrative policies; determine the organisation structure; appoint the Director; and 
fix fees for services provided by EMAO. It is to meet once a month.34 
THE OFFICE 
EMAO has its headquarters in Addis Ababa and maintains an office in Mekele, the 
capital of Tigray – the region most affected by the war with Eritrea. Currently it has 
an approved establishment of 1050 positions, of which 840 (including about 450 
deminers) are currently filled. The organisation chart is given on the following page. 
 
Textbox 8 – Ambiguities in EMAO responsibilities and powers 
EMAO considers itself to be the ‘focal point’ for mine action in Ethiopia. However, the Council 
of Ministers decree is unclear on a number of issues: 
 
EXCLUSIVITY – the decree empowers EMAO to serve as an implementing organisation for 
demining and MRE. It does not preclude other organisations from providing these services. 
 
AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE MINE ACTION – EMAO is authorised to ‘establish relations’ with 
other domestic and international organisations involved in demining or MRE, but the decree 
does not explicitly confer any authority over any or all of these organisations. In short, the 
decree does not establish EMAO as the national authority. 
 
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY AND POLICIES – no mention is made of a national strategy for 
mine action (the Director is required to submit an annual work program and budget, and to 
implement this upon approval). As well, there is no mention of any authority for setting 
policies that other organisations would be required to follow. Arguably, the need for a strategy 
and national policies falls under the provision to ‘carry out other activities as are necessary for 
the attainment of its objectives’. However, the Board is only empowered to issue 
‘administrative policies of the Office’ (i.e. policies for internal operations), so it appears EMAO 
could only propose national strategies and policies to the minister responsible. In the absence 
of national mine action legislation to confer specific authorities vis-à-vis landmines and UXO 
on the minister responsible, it is unclear whether such a strategy or policies would legally bind 
other public or private organisations (particularly important in Ethiopia where the Constitution 
and legislation provide regional and woreda governments with extensive authorities). This 
suggests that, for a national strategy or policy to have full effect, it would have to be adopted 
by the Council of Ministers. 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) – EMAO clearly has authority to establish internal QA. However, the 
decree states clearly that EMAO is to ‘cooperate with organizations assigned to certify that 
the areas in which [landmines and UXO were present] are cleared from such explosives’ (i.e. 
the ERPMU, which had already be given the authority to certify clearance to comply with the 
World Bank loan agreement). This suggests that EMAO cannot issue such certification on its 
own authority, although the provision to ‘carry out other activities as are necessary for the 
attainment of its objectives’ might justify this. 
 
SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES – The decree was passed before Ethiopia became a State Party to the 
Ottawa Convention. It makes no mention of either stockpile destruction or victim assistance, 
and EMAO has not undertaken activities in these components of mine action. 
 
                                                
34 Reportedly, there have been regular meetings, albeit not once a month. 
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Figure 3 – EMAO organisation chart 
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UN Agencies 
UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION ADVISORY TEAM (MAAT) 
At the request of the Federal Government, the UNDP established the Mine Action 
Advisory Team (MAAT) at the beginning of 2001 to assist the country in 
developing an Ethiopian national mine action capacity. The MAAT supports the 
EMAO headquarters as well as its field operations. It has: 
 
• provided advice concerning the establishment of EMAO;  
• trained four manual demining companies and ‘trained-the-trainers’ who 
subsequently trained the fifth and sixth demining companies; 
• assisted in setting-up of the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) and training personnel in data base administration and GIS; 
• advised on the formulation of Ethiopian national mine action standards and 
EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP); 
• advised on the purchase of mechanical equipment for demining and on contracting 
for Mine Detection Dogs (MDDs); 
• advised on the incorporation of MDDs and machines into demining operations.  
 
In recent years, the primary focus of the MAAT has been on field activities, including 
training in quality assurance and advice of the structure and operations of Rapid 
Response Teams (RRTs – small, mobile teams to respond to reports of UXO or 
isolated landmines). 
UN OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES (UNOPS) 
The UNDP contracted UNOPS as the executing agency for its MAAT. In addition, 
UNOPS received a contract from the Emergency Recovery Programme Management 
Unit (ERPMU) to provide Mine Action Quality Assurance consultants to advise on 
how to contract for demining services and to monitor the mine action assets in the 
field. It also served as the procurement agent for the purchase of demining equipment 
(e.g. mine detectors; personal protective equipment), vehicles, etc., drawing mainly on 
World Bank funds through the ERPMU. 
UNICEF 
UNICEF has been supporting mine risk education activities in Tigray since 1999 and 
in Afar since 2001. Implementation has been carried out through a local NGO, the 
Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO), and in close cooperation with 
regional and community-level counterparts. 
 
In August 2003 UNICEF introduced a two-year phase-out strategy, asking RaDO to 
transfer MRE and victim surveillance responsibilities to the regional governments. In 
2005, UNICEF commissioned an independent evaluation of the MRE programme 
from the GICHD, following which UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a 
survey of a number of mine-affected communities to prepare ‘village profiles’ 
outlining their development requirements.35 
 
                                                
35 The MRE and village profile projects are further discussed in the section on RaDO. 
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In future, UNICEF plans to incorporate its mine action support into a more 
comprehensive disability programme. 
UNHCR 
In October 2005, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
commissioned RaDO to provide MRE to Sudanese refugees in five camps in western 
Ethiopia. This is continuing. 
Emergency Rehabilitation Programme 
Following the long civil war that forced the Derg from power in 1991, the new 
Transitional Government launched an Economic Recovery and Reconstruction 
Program, financed by a number of donors and the World Bank. Among this project’s 
objectives was to support reconstruction of roads, power, telecommunications, and 
civil aviation facilities as well as rehabilitation of social infrastructure at the 
community level. Much of the reconstruction work took place in Tigray. During this 
period, the army’s non-combatant Ethiopian Demining Project provided demining 
services for the reconstruction of a number of roads and telecommunications facilities. 
 
After the war with Eritrea, a second programme – the Emergency Rehabilitation 
Programme – was launched; again with World Bank financing. The ERP was 
designed by the Ethiopian Government to mitigate the human, social, and economic 
crises stemming from the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. The ERP consists of two loan-
financed Projects: the Emergency Recovery Project and Emergency Demobilization 
and Reintegration Project (EDRP – briefly discussed in a later section). 
 
The objectives of the Emergency Recovery Project are to assist the Government to:  
 
1. help the war-affected people to rebuild their lives and resume productive 
economic activities;  
2. reconstruct and rehabilitate destroyed and damaged infrastructure to restart the 
provision of services; and  
3. support macro-economic stability in the country. 
   
The ERP has the following components:  
 
• Rehabilitation of households; 
• Rehabilitation of community and economic infrastructure; 
• demining; and 
• HIV/AIDS. 
 
The objective for the demining component itself is to carry out demining in war-
affected areas to enable the return of the displaced population and the rehabilitation of 
their homes and livelihoods.36 Specific tasks include: (i) establishment of a 
humanitarian mine action quality assurance unit within the Emergency Rehabilitation 
Program Management Unit; (ii) provision of humanitarian mine action equipment and 
                                                
36 The performance target was to clear 27 km2 of suspected hazardous area to create an environment 
conducive for the safe return of at least 85% of the IDPs (some 64,000 people in Tigray alone) to their 
homes and livelihoods. In addition, a long term objective was the creation of a national capacity to 
respond to the landmine/UXO threat on a country-wide basis. 
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materials; (iii) training of personnel of the Ethiopian Demining Project (500 persons); 
(iv) landmine and battle area clearance, and disposal; and (v) identification (level 2 
survey) and marking of hazardous areas. 
 
Typically, World Bank loans are provided to a government to allow it to implement a 
project. Accordingly, an Emergency Recovery Project Management Unit (ERPMU) 
was established within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) 
to coordinate activities, and to monitor overall progress in implementation. The 
ERPMU is also responsible for contracting goods and services, requesting 
disbursement of funds, and keeping of accounts on expenditures for regular reporting. 
 
For Tigray, a project implementation management office was opened at the regional 
level in Mekele to manage the operational implementation, with branches at the zonal 
and woreda levels. Rehabilitation Task Forces (RTFs)37 were established in woredas 
and tabias to assist carrying out need assessments of affected populations, monitor, 
review complaints and recommend adjustments when required. This community 
structure allowed needs assessments of each individual beneficiary, as well as their 
uses of benefits received. (MoFED, Baseline Study for Environmental & Social 
Assessment, 83) 
 
It was the ERPMU, in consultation with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Commission (DPPC) bureaus in the regional governments, which established the 
demining priorities for EMAO. In brief, EMAO conducted a general survey to 
document the woredas, tabias/kebeles, and communities that were affected by 
landmines. This information was sent to the ERPMU which, following consultations 
with the regional governments, returned a priority ranking of woredas in Tigray (eight 
woredas) and Afar (three woredas). Within each woreda, the mine-affected kabeles/ 
tabias were ranked by priority. In total, 50 kabeles/tabias were included, of which 44 
were in Tigray. The ERPMU and regional governments gave top priority to those 
woredas and tabias where large numbers of people were displaced – the densely 
populated areas of Eastern and Central Tigray. 
 
Following this priority ranking, the ERPMU negotiated annual contracts with EMAO, 
starting in 2002. In addition, the ERPMU was responsible for:  
 
a) setting the standards for mine clearing works;  
b) reviewing the SOPs and safety regulations of mine clearing agencies;  
c) conducting quality assurance (QA) tests to ensure compliance of mine clearing 
agencies with accepted international standards for humanitarian mine 
clearance and UN guidelines; and  
d) ensuring that all mine clearing activities are carried out and all mines cleared 
under the Project are promptly destroyed in accordance with appropriate safety 
standards and guidelines. 
(World Bank 2000, Technical Annex…, 41) 
 
                                                
37 In Tigray, RaDO had already established Task Forces for MRE, which were merged into the RTFs. 
At each level, these are chaired by the chief executive (e.g. the woreda president), with BoLSA as the 
secretariat. All sector bureaus/offices are represented as are, at lower levels, the associations for 
women, youth, farmers, etc., faith-based organisations, and NGOs. 
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For these purposes, it had international demining consultants in its headquarters,38 and 
QA monitors attached to each of the demining companies.39 
 
It should be recognised that, when the demining component of the ERP was designed, 
the government and the World Bank expected that the armed forces would conduct 
the demining. World Bank policy requires that, if military deminers are used on 
projects it funds, they must work under the control of civilian authorities. Thus, the 
ERPMU was given extensive oversight authority over demining (which was the only 
ERP component in which a government agency worked under contract to the 
ERPMU). Had EMAO been in existence prior to the signature of the loan agreement, 
it may have been given some of the powers vested in the ERPMU.  
Other Public Sector Agencies 
DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS COMMISSION (DPPC) 
The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) is the government 
agency that coordinates relief programs in Ethiopia, including mine action during the 
emergency and rehabilitation phases. In the aftermath of the war with Eritrea, the 
DPPC regional office in Mekele worked with the ERPMU to prepare the list of the 50 
most infected kebeles/tabias in Tigray and Afar regions. 
 
The DPPC is also responsible for coordinating and evaluating the work of both local 
and international NGOs in Ethiopia and its Regions. 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (MOLSA) 
MoLSA is the ministry responsible for coordinating rehabilitation services for people 
with disabilities. As such, it has been sending a representative to recent meetings of 
States Parties to the APMBC, as well as Intersessionals, to discuss victim assistance. 
However, there is no specific national programme for landmine victims. MoLSA also 
oversees four Prosthetic and Orthotic Centres (POCs), but it is widely thought that 
only a small percentage of disabled people, including landmine survivors, receive 
adequate medical and physical rehabilitation services. 
BUREAU OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (BOLSA) AND DISASTER PREVENTION 
AND PREPAREDNESS AND FOOD SECURITY BUREAU (DPPFSB) 
These are the regional bureaus that UNICEF has attempted to transfer responsibility 
for MRE and victim surveillance in Tigray and Afar respectively. In at least in some 
woredas in Tigray, BoLSA officers appear to monitor MRE activities and collect 
accident reports. However, it seems this information is not transmitted to EMAO. 
Funding agencies 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The Federal Government provided some start-up funding for EMAO (e.g. salary 
repayments to a number of ministries which had staff seconded to the start-up task 
                                                
38 The Credit Agreement for the World Bank loan specified that the ERPMU establish a quality 
assurance unit within the ERPMU secretariat, which included at least one international expert. 
39 EMAO initiated its own QA in 2004 and, with the wind-down of the ERP, recently assumed 
responsibility for this function. 
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force that designed EMAO, drafted the decree, etc.). The Government continues to 
make an annual budget provision of 17-20 million birr ($2+ million) for 
‘contingencies’ (i.e. not spent unless required). This was drawn-upon often in the first 
year due to delays in securing the initial contract with the ERP. Since then, some 
contingency funds have been expended for items not covered by World Bank loan 
funds (deminer insurance and some types of vehicle expenditures). However, in E.C. 
1998 (i.e. 2005-06), EMAO repaid over 11.5 million birr ($1.35 million) to the 
treasury for disbursements made by the Federal Government from 2002 to 2005. 
 
In addition, the Government contributed $6.5 million to the ERP overall, although this 
is not earmarked for demining. Thus, Government financial contributions from its 
own revenues to mine action have been modest to date. Most funding has been 
provided by the World Bank ERP loan. The loan will have to be repaid eventually, so 
this represents an important contribution and a good indication that the Government 
takes its landmine problem seriously. 
WORLD BANK EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROJECT (ERP) 
The major objectives are to help the war-affected people rebuild their lives and 
resume productive economic activities; to reconstruct and rehabilitate destroyed and 
damaged infrastructure; and restart provision of services. This was financed by a $230 
million credit from the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan 
arm of the World Bank. In addition, the Government provided $6.5 million and the 
community contributions were valued at $6.6 million. 
 
The loan originally provided $30 million for the demining component, which was 
subsequently revised down to $15 million. In the past year, an additional $3.5 million 
was transferred to the demining component, bringing the total to $18.5 million. Five 
contracts were issued to EMAO for the demining component, and UNOPS was 
contracted to procure equipment for EMAO and QA experts for the ERPMU itself. 
 
The recent report on the impact of the ERP reports that a total of 24.3 km2 of land had 
been demined, implying an average cost of $0.77 per m2, which is extremely cost 
effective by international standards. 
 
A sister World Bank-financed project also provided substantial assistance to disabled 
war veterans, including landmine survivors (see textbox). 
 
Textbox 9 – Survivor Assistance through the Emergency Demobilisation & 
Reintegration Project (EDRP) 
The EDRP was a $170.6 million sister project to the Emergency Recovery Project that 
assisted the government in demobilising and reintegrating 148,000 veterans (98.6% of the 
original target).  
 
An estimated 17,000 disabled veterans were designated as a special target group, eligible for 
somewhat higher economic reintegration assistance payments ($605 for mildly disabled and 
$675 for moderately disabled, compared to $425 for other veterans), as well as targeted 
medical assistance.  
 
To meet the demand for prosthetic-orthotic and physiotherapy care for the 17,000 disabled 
war veterans, the project paid to rehabilitate, equip, and staff the Alage rehabilitation centre 
(to serve as the National Rehabilitation Centre) and five regional prosthetic orthotic centres 
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(POCs). The Alage centre provides intensive care to the approximately 1,000 severely 
disabled veterans, while the other POCs address the needs of the 16,000 less severely 
disabled veterans. The original budget provided $12.3 million for this component, but 
Landmine Monitor 2002 reported that over $19 million would be spent. 
 
It is unclear how many of the disabled veterans were survivors of landmine accidents. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
The EC originally provided over $1 million in funding for the ELIS. In 2004, the EC 
and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Secretariat agreed in principle to 
allocate €10 million to both Eritrea and Ethiopia for peace-building initiatives.40 
Subsequently the EC and ACP Secretariat agreed with the Ethiopian Government to 
allocate €8 million of this to mine action. The financing agreement for the Ethiopian 
project has just recently been signed by the EC and the ACP States. 
 
The EC is now revising its Country Strategy Paper for Ethiopia and, if mine action is 
included as one of the focus areas, more funds could be forthcoming for EMAO in the 
future. In addition, the EU is forging stronger links with the African Union (AU), 
which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. This could lead to spin-off benefits for 
Ethiopia’s mine action programme. 
NORWAY AND OTHER BILATERAL DONORS 
Norway provided significant funding to both NPA ($1.02 million) and the UNDP 
($374,500) for the ELIS. It has since funded UNDP for the MAAT and, in 2005, 
agreed to fund the NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project through at least the end of 
2007. The Embassy advised the Evaluation Team that Norway is open to the 
possibility of additional mine action support in the future.  
 
Funds for mine action in Ethiopia have also been provided by (at least) Canada, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.41  
 
We estimate that over $31 million has been provided for mine action from 2001-05, 
with a peak in 2002 due to heavy equipment purchases. About half of the total 
funding to date has come from the World Bank loan. 
 
                                                
40 This was from EUR 50 million in unexpended monies from the Seventh European Development 
Fund (EDF VII) that was allocated  for peacebuilding initiatives. EDF funds are not part of the EC 
budget, and are financed by voluntary contributions from EU member states and managed jointly by 
the EC and the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Secretariat in Brussels. 
41 LMM 2004 reported that the U.S. provided $8.8 million in assistance from 1993-99. 
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Operators 
EMAO is the principal operator in Ethiopia, and the only civilian agency currently 
engaged in demining. In addition, it has community liaison officers attached to each 
of its demining companies who inform communities of planned clearance activities 
and obtain details of how mines and UXO impact the communities, which they feed 
back to the demining company commanders responsible for the clearance activities.42 
RONCO 
In 2001 the U.S. Department of State funded the firm RONCO to provide start-up 
assistance to EMAO. It trained and partially equipped the first two demining 
companies, and monitored their operations for some months. 
NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID (NPA) 
NPA implemented the Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) from late 2001-04. 
In mid-2005, NPA initiated its Humanitarian Mine Action Project, designed to 
support EMAO’s capacity development in the area of MDDs and technical survey/ 
task impact assessment (TIA – NPA’s ‘brand name’ for socio-economic assessment 
of demining tasks). The current NPA project is discussed in the next Chapter. 
REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (RADO) 
The Rehabilitation and Development Organization, an Ethiopian NGO, was founded 
in 1997 with a mandate to help and rehabilitate physically disabled persons. Starting 
in late 1999, RaDO received a grant from the World Bank to initiate emergency mine 
risk education in Tigray. Later that same year, UNICEF began funding the MRE in 
Tigray43 and, in 2001, Afar. 
 
                                                
42 According to RaDO, the work of EMAO community liaison officers has resulted in improved 
cooperation with demining teams, reduced removal of minefield markers, improved respect for 
minefield fences and signs, and increased the number of suspect mines and UXO reported to EMAO 
teams. (LMM, 2005) 
43 Initially, UNICEF also provided technical assistance to RaDO. 
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In mid-2003, UNICEF adopted a two-year transition strategy in which RaDO’s role 
was to build capacity in regional government units in both Tigray and Afar. Following 
this, UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a Village Profile Project to assess 
the development priorities in 11 mine-affected communities (some cleared but others 
still impacted by contamination). RaDO submitted its draft report in 2006, but this has 
not been finalised.44 
 
Since October 2005 on behalf of the UNHCR, RaDO has also been provided MRE to 
Sudanese refugees in five camps in Western Ethiopia.  
OTHERS 
A number of other organisations have modest programmes that provide assistance to 
landmine survivors, in programmes that focus specifically on landmine survivors or 
(more often) as part of broader disability assistance programmes. These include 
Landmine Survivors Network (LSN),  the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the Ethiopian Red Cross, and four orthopaedic workshops administered by 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA): the Addis Ababa Prosthetic 
Orthotic Centre (POC), as the national referral centre for physical rehabilitation; the 
Mekele Orthopaedic and Physiotherapy Centre; and POCs in Dessie and Harar. 
3.3  Strategy 
Current Strategy 
Until this point, EMAO’s operations have been financed principally by the ERP and 
so it has operated largely within the framework of the ERP strategy. The objectives of 
the ERP centre on the need to resettle – in a sustainable manner – IDPs displaced by 
the war, plus returnees and deportees from Eritrea. Sustainability means that the war-
damaged social and economic infrastructure has to be rehabilitated, and that the large 
minefields in agricultural areas have to be cleared, which provides a clear focus for 
the demining component. 
 
The specific objectives of the demining component of the ERP are to:45 
 
• mitigate the threat of landmines and UXO; and  
• create an environment conducive for the safe and sustainable return of civilians to 
their homes and livelihood. 
Draft Strategy 
In parallel to the Landmine Impact Survey, the mine action section from Cranfield 
University undertook a number of missions in 2003-04 to advise and conduct a 
workshop on strategic planning for mine action, but this did not lead to a strategic 
plan. EMAO subsequently established a strategic planning team and all staff members 
had an opportunity to participate in the formulation of a draft plan for 1999-2003 E.C. 
(i.e. July 2006 to June 2011). This has been submitted to its Board for adoption, but 
has not yet been approved by the Federal Government.46  
                                                
44 The Evaluation Team has been unable to obtain a copy of the draft report. 
45 From the Technical Annex for the World Bank loan. 
46 The Evaluation Team did not obtain a copy of the draft strategy; rather, EMAO provided a copy of a 
PowerPoint presentation on the strategy. 
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The draft strategy sets the following goals: 
 
1. Elimination of the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO in mine-
affected communities; 
2. Provide mine risk education effectively to mine affected communities and thereby 
reduce the number of victims; 
3. Build an internationally competent mine action program; 
4. Build a mine information system capacity which will assist in planning of 
demining and MRE, and will provide full information to other developmental 
[actors?] 
 
It is important to note that the draft strategy was prepared according to the guidelines 
issued by the Federal Government’s civil service reform programme.47 As such, it 
appears to serve more as a corporate strategy for EMAO as an organisation48 than a 
strategy for a national mine action programme (i.e. a document that serves to 
coordinate the actions of all actors involved, directly or indirectly, in mine action). 
For example, the specific objectives for MRE relate only to communities in which 
EMAO is conducting mine clearance, together with neighbouring communities – 
there is nothing concerning the MRE requirements in the rest of the country. 
 
As well, the draft strategy is silent on stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and 
other Treaty obligations, which were not mentioned in the February 2001 decree. At 
the same time, it is clear that EMAO management is aware that its mandate laid out in 
the decree is too narrow, and the draft strategy recommends revising the decree to 
include responsibility: 
o for QA and certification of land clearance 
o for control, coordination, accreditation, and licensing (presumably, of 
other organisations providing mine action services) 
o to directly negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements 
o to serve as the national ‘focal point’ for all mine action issues. 
3.4  Priority-setting 
To date, the location and sequencing of demining operations have been dictated 
principally by the list of priorities (woredas and tabias/kebeles) established in 2002 by 
the ERPMU in consultation with regional governments in Tigray and Afar. In 2005, 
EMAO converted its MRE personnel into community liaison officers who – in 
addition to their MRE tasks – review demining plans with local authorities. According 
to the Director General of EMAO, these consultations have only resulted in two 
changes to the original priority list. EMAO was able to accommodate one of these 
requests without the need for an adjustment to the established list of priorities. For the 
other (in a remote part of Afar), EMAO has examined the requested change, but is 
unconvinced it is warranted given the criteria established for determining priorities, or 
that the security in the area would allow the demining teams to work in safety. 
 
                                                
47 All public organisations were required to prepare a strategic plan encompassing expected outcomes, 
key result areas and objectives.  
48 There are five sub-programmes to the Civil Service Reform Programme: (i) improve leadership/ 
management structure; (ii) personnel management improvement; (iii) improved service delivery; (iv) 
resource use & expenditure management, and (v) ethics and anti-corruption. 
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The current priority-setting system is geared to establishing priority rankings for large 
areas (i.e. minefield belt in a tabia) that will be addressed by large demining units 
(companies). The Evaluation Team was unable to make a complete assessment of 
how well the micro task sequencing (i.e. which parts of the minefield belt within a 
tabia are cleared first) is conducted. The existence of the community liaison officers 
attached to each demining company suggests that there is at least a channel for local 
communities to voice their preferences, and all of the regional, woreda, and tabia 
officials we met expressed satisfaction with the work of EMAO deminers. 
 
EMAO has on occasion responded to requests by sending small demining teams to 
address emergencies,49 but it appears the priority-setting system does not readily 
accommodate emergency requests relating to small clearance tasks (e.g. a few mines 
or UXO) from communities outside the areas in which the demining companies 
happen to be located. The evidence from other mine action programmes suggests that 
the ability to respond quickly to such requests is important as a casualty reduction 
measure, particularly as the ‘footprints’ of communities expand due to economic 
and/or population growth, bringing community members into contact with more 
remote contamination. Presumably, such requests could be handled in the future by 
the proposed Rapid Response Teams (RRT) once these are operational. 
 
The more fundamental issue is that the current system for establishing priorities is 
unlikely to be adequate once demining companies are re-located from the mine belt 
along the Eritrean border50 to other regions of the country, where minefields are 
smaller and more dispersed. The draft strategy does not appear to address this issue in 
any depth, and simply proposes the following criteria for setting demining priorities: 
 
1. Alleviation of human suffering in areas where casualty rates are high; 
2. Enable the resettlement of internally displaced people;  
3. Support for regional and national reconstruction/rehabilitation programmes; 
and 
4. Food security projects to increase the availability of agriculture and grazing 
lands.51 
3.5  Operations 
Demining 
MANUAL MINE CLEARANCE 
In 1995, the U.S. Defense Department provided training and equipment52 to three 
non-combatant army demining companies – each with 100 personnel – which 
conducted demining operations (along with limited MRE) as the Ethiopian Demining 
Project (EDP) in various areas of the country until 2001. The original plans for the 
demining component of the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme envisaged that the 
                                                
49 For example, it sent a team of eight deminers and support personnel to Addis Ababa following an 
explosion of an ammunition stockpile, as this was a national priority.  
50 A company is also working in Jijiga woreda of the Somali region, but we understand it is also 
working on large perimeter minefields around Jijiga airport. 
51 These are virtually the same criteria reported in the Draft ELIS report from 2004. 
52 The German Government also donated equipment in 1997. 
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EDP would be the government’s demining contractor,53 however, the Government 
subsequently decided to establish an autonomous civilian agency (EMAO) and to 
transfer most of the EDP personnel to it.54 
 
Accordingly, in 2001-02 the U.S. State Department contracted the firm RONCO to re-
train55 and partially equip EMAO’s first two manual demining companies. These were 
deployed to Tigray in March 2002,56 and for some months RONCO provided a 
technical monitor attached to both companies. Training of a third manual demining 
company began in September 2002 and, in December 2002, this was deployed.  
 
In 2004, a fourth demining company was trained and deployed, and the UN MAAT 
also conducted a train-the-trainers sessions, allowing EMAO trainers to complete the 
training of the fifth and sixth demining companies in 2005, one of which was 
deployed to Jijiga woreda in Somali region.57 
 
EMAO now has six demining companies located in three separate regions – four 
companies in Tigray, one in Afar and one in Somali region.  The general structure of 
the companies is shown below. 
 




                                                
53 World Bank policy does not prohibit the use of military deminers on Bank-funded projects, so long 
as these function under the direction of civilian authorities and the demining “is an integral part of a 
development project or a prelude to a future development project or program to be adopted by the 
borrower.” World Bank Operational Guidelines for Financing Land Mine Clearance, 1997. 
54 A number of considerations appear to have influenced this decision – UN advice that a civilian 
agency could be managed more effectively and attract more donor support, plus the hope that a civilian 
agency might eventually be able to compete successfully for international demining contracts. 
55 The training provided to EDP deminers in 1995 predated the adoption on the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), so the re-training was, in part, to ensure demining was IMAS-compliant. 
56 EMAO received its first demining contract from ERPMU in August 2002. 
57 These were military deminers seconded to EMAO. In 2006, these deminers were formally transferred 
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A company commander has three or (for the 5th & 6th companies) four platoons and, 
depending on the operational need, may have mechanical or dog support attached to 
his unit (see below).  The manual deminers, who form the core of the company, are 
well equipped and trained, and appear to work in a professional manner.  
 


























Based on site visits in Western Tigray, it appears that EMAO’s manual demining 
operations compare favourably with others from Africa and internationally. This 
appears to be the result of the discipline of the Ethiopian deminers (most of whom 
originally served in the armed forces); effective management and supervision by the 
officers in each company, and by the Mekele office and Addis Ababa headquarters; 
and the training and technical advice offered to EMAO through UNDP. 
 
MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD) 
EMAO originally introduced MDD into its demining operations when it issued a one-
year contract to the firm ArmorGroup in 2004 to provide six dogs and handlers. The 
ERPMU would not extend this contract with World Bank funds, but DfID agreed to 
finance an extension to continue MDD support to demining operations until NPA 
could import, acclimatise, and accredit its MDD (discussed in the next chapter). 
ArmorGroup donated its dogs to EMAO in the summer of 2006.  After an assessment, 
NPA decided not to use any of the six ArmorGroup dogs. It now is operating with 19 
dogs imported from NPA’s Global Training Centre (GTC) in Bosnia and the NPA 
programme in Mozambique. 
 
From observing the operations of the MDD in Tigray region, it is clear they are an 
excellent addition to the capacity of EMAO. Although the change from the concept 
employed by ArmorGroup (essentially free running and long-leash dogs) to the NPA 
approach (long- and short-leash dogs58) was not universally endorsed in advance, it 
appears that NPA’s concept is well conceived and the implementation has been 
effective. The local handlers are extremely professional and dedicated to the effective 
use of the dogs. Although the output of the NPA dogs is lower than achieved by 
ArmorGroup (whose contract had a performance target of 2,000 m2 per day per dog, 
                                                
58 NPA procedures call for (in most cases), ground to be covered by a dog on a long leash, then a 
second pass by a dog on a short-leash. 
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whereas NPA procedures produce up to 1,400 m2 per day, and average less), this has 
been accepted because there were concerns as to the quality of the previous output.59 
Six more MDD are due to arrive in March 2007, bringing the total to 25. 
 
IMAS 09.40 (draft Edition 2) states that a central feature of the implementation of 
IMAS standards for MDD60 must be the operational accreditation of MDD teams 
(dogs and handlers). EMAO Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSG) lay out the 
process of accreditation of MDD.  The accreditation area at Gemhalo offers sufficient 
boxes and facilities to complete an effective accreditation procedure and the one 
accreditation process viewed as part of this process appeared to have been undertaken 
professionally and to have followed the TSG.   
 
MECHANICAL GROUND PREPARATION 
In 2004, EMAO purchased three Bozena IV mini flails from Slovakia to provide 
mechanical ground preparation support for both the MDD teams and the manual 
demining companies. The purchase was financed from the World Bank loan 
administered by the ERPMU. Training services and a stock of spare parts were also 
part of the contract. 
 
Bozena IV’s are widely viewed as well-designed and durable demining machines, 
suitable for ground preparation in a variety of conditions. From observations during 
the site visit to Western Tigray, it is apparent that EMAO mechanics are well trained 
and the three Bozenas are well maintained and operating effectively. These machines 
appear to have been a sound purchase.  
 
TECHNICAL SURVEY 
The current EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) defines Technical Survey 
as “a step between the National Survey and actual demining activities.”  The current 
modus operandi for Technical Survey is a platoon of deminers who are sent to a task 
shortly before a company is deployed for clearance. The SOP does offer some 
description of the physical process required to undertake such a task but, on the 
ground, the Technical Survey Platoons essentially operate as minefield marking and 
delineation teams (i.e. they do not probe into the suspected minefield to determine its 
boundaries more precisely and, thereby, release as much land as possible).   
 
Still, the process of delineating and marking minefields in preparation for clearance 
has improved significantly since operations in Tigray commenced, in part because 
greater use is being made of minefield sketch maps handed over by the Eritrean army 
following the peace agreement. This has resulted in more land being released through 
a fairly simple re-survey without clearance, thereby focussing expensive clearance 
operations on areas where there remains a strong suspicion that landmines are present. 
 
                                                
59 Training MDD is not yet a science, and there are heated debates over which concept is better. Free 
running dogs tend to cover more area, but it is harder to ensure the entire area is adequately covered 
(e.g. dogs may not keep their noses close to the ground). The performance of dogs working on a short 
leash is easier to monitor, but daily productivity rarely averages as much as 1000 m2 per dog. 
60 In addition to IMAS 9.40 – Use of MDD, there are IMAS 9.41 – Operational procedures for MDD, 
and IMAS 9.42 – Operational Accreditation for MDD. 
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Release of land through demining
61
 
Technique Area released % of total 
Re-survey (with Eritrean sketch maps) 82.3 km2 75% 
Technical survey 3.3 km2 3% 
Clearance 23.7 km2 22% 
Total 109.3 km2  
  
INTEGRATION 
EMAO now has a range of complementary assets in its demining ‘toolbox’ – manual 
companies; machines; MDD. Each of these is functioning well and EMAO’s overall 
productivity compares favourable with most other demining programmes in the 
world. The challenge is to continue the performance improvement process. 
Experience elsewhere suggests that further performance improvements could come 
from three sources (which are not mutually exclusive).  
 
1. Incremental productivity improvements through ‘learning by doing’, 
supplemented by exchanges with other programmes; 
 
How effectively a demining ‘toolbox’ is utilised depends largely on the demining 
commanders and supervisors, who must understand how each type of asset will 
perform given the conditions (weather; slope; vegetation; metal content of the soil; 
types of munitions present; etc.), and how to combine the different assets to best take 
advantage of their complementary performance characteristics. This takes experience, 
but the learning process can be accelerated if commanders and supervisors have the 
opportunity to visit other demining programmes to exchange experiences with others 
employing integrated demining approaches.62 
 
2. Use of machines and dogs for more aggressive area reduction,63 reserving 
expensive full clearance operations for areas in which there remains a strong 
suspicion of the presence of landmines; 
 
Initial surveys of landmine contamination rarely have adequate data or the time to 
accurately delimit minefield boundaries, and much more land is recorded as ‘suspect’ 
than ultimately will be found to be contaminated. Many national demining 
programmes are experimenting with ways to release suspect land without full 
clearance. EMAO has been achieving more land release in recent years because of 
better investigation based on Eritrean minefield sketch maps, but does not have 
procedures in place to release even more land based only on the use of machines 
and/or MDD (as shown in the table above, only 3% of the SHA released to date has 
been through technical survey). With more experience using the machine and dog 
assets, it may be possible to releasing more land faster and cheaper. 
 
3. Greater incorporation of socio-economic analysis to ensure demining assets are 
focused on those areas that are likely to be used without delay to enhance the 
wellbeing of people in mine-affected communities. 
                                                
61 At the time of the mission, a further 36 km2 of SHA in Tigray remained for re-survey. We 
understand this re-survey is now underway. 
62 In a useful initiative, NPA has arranged for the Director General of EMAO to visit Cambodia to view 
demining operations in that large and technically sophisticated programme. 
63 The current SOP only allow for Technical Survey undertaken by manual mine demining teams. 
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Productivity and cost-efficiency are important aspects of performance. However, 
experience from other mine action programmes shows that better targeting of 
demining assets on land that will yield the greatest socio-economic benefits without 
delay is often more important than operational efficiency in yielding good programme 
outcomes.64 This requires some way of incorporating socio-economic data into the 
system for setting task priorities.  
 
Until now, task assignments have been based almost entirely on priorities established 
by the ERPMU and regional authorities in 2002. This has worked remarkably well 
until now, in part because the local administrative systems in Tigray work effectively 
and in part because the clear focus was on resettlement of large numbers of displaced 
people. A new approach to setting priorities will be required as EMAO redeploys 
assets away from the mine belt close to Eritrea, and into regions where local 
administration may not be as well established as Tigray. Any new approach will 
require a mechanism for incorporating socio-economic issues more explicitly into the 
decision-making process. NPA’s Task Impact Assessment (TIA) approach could be 
useful in this regard if it can be suitably adapted to Ethiopia’s governance structures 
(which may vary from one region to another). This is discussed in the next Chapter. 
 
OTHER POINTS 
Observations and discussions with demining personnel during the site visits in 
western Tigray suggest that mapping skills remain rudimentary. As well, mapping 
procedures need to document the use of assets and the clearance actually undertaken, 
which are not done adequately at the present time.  
Recommendation 2 
EMAO should arrange upgraded training in mapping for (at least) company and platoon 
commanders, and surveyors. 
 
During our mission, concerns were expressed at procedures to investigate accidents 
that occur during EMAO clearance operations. IMAS 10.60 requires formal 
investigations to be conducted by an “appropriately qualified and experienced third 
party” for a number of defined situations (including “a demining accident resulting in 
injury or death”).  It further requires the National Mine Action Authority, or 
organisation acting on its behalf, to disseminate the information on demining 
incidents.  
 
In addition, the EMAO SOP and TSG require the completion of an IMSMA form 
with details of the accident to be completed and submitted to the IMSMA database.  
It appears that not all accident records are delivered to and recorded in IMSMA.  
More of a concern is the lack of third party expertise on the board of enquiry that are 
convened for such investigations.  
Recommendation 3 
EMAO should ensure that all investigations of demining accidents are conducted in 
accordance with IMAS 10.60, and that all details of such accidents are recorded in 
IMSMA. 
                                                
64 An excellent measure of overall performance is the ratio of benefits to costs. Enhancing productivity 
and cost-effectiveness raises this ratio by reducing costs, but the ratio can also be raised by targeting 
demining assets to land that delivers the greatest benefits to people. 
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Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
Most MRE has been conducted by RaDO, which began with mass sensitization for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. In mid-2000 RaDO converted to a 
community-based approach, training community volunteer representatives and 
establishing community task forces for MRE (which were subsequently absorbed into 
the RTFs established by the ERP).65 In 2001, RaDO introduced MRE in the schools, 
established MRE drama clubs in all schools, and initiated child-to-child component by 
training child survivors as instructors. In the same year, it expanded into three 
woredas in Afar, adapting its programme to the needs of pastoralists.66 During this 
period, RaDO also collected victim data, which showed a significant reduction in 
accidents following the end of the war. 
 



























In 2003, UNICEF introduced an MRE transition strategy, in which RaDO’s role was 
to build the capacities of the Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (ORSA) in 
Tigray,67 and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau 
(DPPFSB) in Afar to continue MRE and victim surveillance. RaDO’s MRE activities 
in Tigray and Afar ended in August 2005. 
 
In late 2005, UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a project to develop village 
profiles for 11 mine-affected communities in Tigray. At the time of the evaluation 
mission, RaDO had submitted a draft report.68 
 
EMAO also delivers MRE for communities in the vicinity of current demining 
operations. 
 
UNMEE has also provided MRE in the areas bordering the Temporary Security Zone 
(TSZ) established between Ethiopia and Eritrea (most of which lies in Eritrea). 
 
In 2005, UNICEF commissioned an evaluation of the MRE programme in Tigray and 
Afar, which concluded it was one of the world’s better MRE programmes due to the 
                                                
65 RaDO maintained an office in Mekele, with coordinators at both the zonal and woreda levels, plus 
agents in the most affected tabias – 36 staff in all at the start, covering seven woredas and 44 tabias. 
66 Most pastoralists are Muslim, so RaDO worked with imams, using mosques as well as schools. 
67 This is now the Bureau for Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA). 
68 The evaluation team has not yet been able to obtain a copy. 
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efforts of RaDO and the community liaison work by EMAO, as well as the high level 
of social capital in the most heavily affected communities of Tigray. However, the 
evaluation concluded that: 
 
• there is inadequate coordination at the national level, due in part to the fact that no 
organisation had a clear mandate to coordinate MRE; 
• a continued MRE programme is warranted for Tigray, and there may well be a 
need for MRE elsewhere in the country, particularly Somali region. However, 
project management skills needed to be strengthened in both EMAO and (for 
Tigray) BoLSA, and a proper needs assessment is required for Somali Region; 
• a sustainable surveillance system (complete victim data and periodic risk 
assessments) is required; 
• greater attention should be given to emergency preparedness. 
 
The MRE evaluation report provided a number of recommendations to address these 
weaknesses. Little appears to have been done to implement these recommendations, 
and the above conclusions still appear valid. 
Survivor Assistance 
A large number of organisations are involved in some aspect of victim assistance, but 
most of the programmes are small and are involved in disability assistance rather than 
landmine survivors per se. In 2004, Ethiopia was identified at the Nairobi Review 
Conference as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, 
and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and 
expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation 
and reintegration of survivors. 
 
As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Ethiopia identified its survivor 
assistance objectives for the period 2005-2009 as:  
 
• establishing a continuous surveillance system for accurate data collection; 
• conducting a needs assessment of survivors;  
• establishing or strengthening clinics and services for rehabilitation and 
psychosocial support for mine survivors and other war victims;  
• establishing or strengthening vocational training centres;  
• improving access to formal education and vocational training;  
• developing a strategic plan for mine victim assistance, in cooperation with 
relevant agencies and organisations. 
(LMM 2005) 
 
The Evaluation Team did not review survivor assistance programmes in depth, but it 
appears that little progress has been made toward these objectives. In the meantime, 
Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) runs a small peer-to-peer programme that 
remains restricted to Addis Ababa. The ICRC supports the Ethiopian Red Cross in a 
modest programme for social and economic integration for landmine survivors in 
Tigray. In addition, the ICRC supports a number of government and private prosthetic 
and orthopaedic centres. The World Bank financed Emergency Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Project (the sister project to the ERP within the overall Emergency 
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Recovery Program) established a national rehabilitation centre and refurbished a 
number of regional physical rehabilitation centres.  
 
Ethiopia has disability legislation but reportedly there is no mechanism to enforce the 
rights for disabled person established in the law. The Ethiopian Federation of Persons 
with Disabilities is an umbrella organisation of the five national disability 
associations. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) coordinates 
disability issues at the national level, while the bureaus do the same at the regional 
and woreda levels. MoLSA has been sending a representative to attend Meetings of 
States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty, but the Ministry is not represented on the EMAO 
Steering Board. 
Stockpile Destruction 
Ethiopia has not submitted its inventory of anti-personnel landmines in its possession 
as required by Article 7 of the APMBC (for Ethiopia, the due date was 28 November 
2005). As well, it has not advised the States Parties of plans to complete the 
destruction all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under 
its jurisdiction or control (Article 4 of the Convention specifies a State Party should 
complete stockpiled destruction as soon as possible but not later than four years after 
the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party).  
Participation in the Ottawa Process 
Ethiopia was among the first cohort of countries to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) on 3 December 1997; however, it did not ratify the Convention 
until 17 December 2004. It became a State Party on 1 June 2005. 
 
The Government has not reported any steps taken to implement the treaty 
domestically, including penal sanctions, as required by Article 9 of the APMBC. As 
well, it has not submitted its initial transparency report required by Article 7 
(originally due by 28 November 2005). 
 
Ethiopia has been attending recent Meetings of States Parties. 
 
Recommendation 4 
The Board of EMAO should convene a meeting of representatives from the relevant 
ministries, including at least the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Health, Labour 
and Social Affairs, and Legal Affairs to review Ethiopia’s obligations with respect to the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to initiate a process to prepare its initial 
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4.  NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project 
 
Until recently, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) did not have a Resident 
Representative in Ethiopia, but it has a long history of providing development support 
to Ethiopia, most recently through the support of micro-credit programmes of local 
NGOs, particularly in Tigray. NPA’s first involvement in Ethiopia’s mine action 
programme was as the implementation agency for the Ethiopian Landmine Impact 
Survey (ELIS) from 2002-04. Following the completion of the ELIS, NPA and 
EMAO entered into discussions about a possible project in which NPA would support 
the capacity development efforts of EMAO, with a focus on mine detection dogs 
(MDD) and Technical Survey.  
 
The project was agreed in mid-2005, and NPA initiated operations in October that 
year. By the end of 2005, NPA had established and furnished an office in Addis 
Ababa (shared by the NPA development programme) in close proximity to EMAO 
headquarters. Funding for the mine action project has been secured for 2005-06 from 
Norway (NOK 13,520,000 = c. $1.9 million), and Finland (€400,000 = c. $510,000). 
The project is due to run until the end of 2007, although the possibility exists for an 
extension. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the project is clearly designed to enhance EMAO 
capacity, and not to establish NPA as an independent operation. Thus, EMAO will 
remain the only demining operator in Ethiopia, without the vexing task of 
coordinating a number of independent operators.  
4.1  Project Objectives 
The project seeks to promote three developmental objectives: 
 
1. To support and further strengthen national mine action capacities 
2. To contribute to the reduction of mine and UXO accidents   
3. To facilitate safe settlement and access to land for the target group  
 
Specific output targets are: 
 
Capacity building 
1. MDD capacity 
1.1 25 mine detection dogs accredited  
At least 4 qualified as supervisors 1.2 20 MDD handlers trained & accredited 
(including support to technical survey) At least 2 qualified as trainers 
1.3 1 fully-equipped MDD mobile base  
1.4 1 fully equipped MDD training centre  
2. Technical Survey & Task Impact Assessment (TIA) 
2.1 6 task impact assessment (TIA) officers 
trained 
One for each demining company 
At least 3 qualified as Team Leaders 2.2 15 technical surveyors trained (including 
implementation of MDD-assisted tech survey) At least 2 qualified as trainers 
 
These outputs are then expected to (i) increase the amount of land made available for 
safe use by civilians through reduction of suspected hazards areas and clearance, (ii) 
enhance clearance operations through better task planning and site preparation by 
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Technical Survey teams, and (iii) improve the documentation and reporting of socio-
economic benefits accruing from demining operations. 
 
It appears the final project agreement represented some bargaining between EMAO 
and NPA. EMAO is enthusiastic about the MDD component. It believed the 2004 
decision to contract the six ArmorGroup dogs was successful, but the ERPMU would 
not extend the contract and it is extremely unlikely that Ethiopia would use its own 
funds for MDD. EMAO also planned to enhance its Technical Survey capacity and 
establish Rapid Response Teams (RRT), and NPA’s offer of assistance fits into these 
plans. However, EMAO is less enthusiastic about the TIA concept. It only agreed to 
have it incorporated as part of the Technical Survey component, and with the limited 
role of informing decisions related to technical survey work, and documenting and 
reporting on socio-economic benefits; not as an input into the priority-setting 
process.69 




4.2  Mine Detection Dog (MDD) Component 
Start-up 
An expatriate MDD Coordinator was hired in late summer and, by mid-October 2005, 
a dog kennel and an operational-base camp were established in Gemhalo, western 
Tigray. The first batch of 15 dogs (eight from NPA’s Global Training Centre in 
Sarajevo and seven from Mozambique, where NPA is closing its demining 
                                                
69 Conversely, NPA sees TIA as a mechanism for setting task priorities. In the case of Ethiopia, which 
has reasonably effective priority-setting mechanisms through local governments, NPA seems to have 
anticipated that TIA would supplement and improve these mechanisms. For example, in its interim 
report to the Norwegian MFA, NPA wrote that a key activity of the project would be the “Development 
of strategies and procedures to ensure that the programme will have high socio-economic impact and 




MDD Coordinator Technical Survey 
(Ops Manager) 
Admin & Finance (for 
all NPA-Ethiopia)  
• 2x Bosnian 
handlers 
• 6x Ethiopian 
handlers 
• 5x kennel 
assistants 
• 5x 10-person TS 
teams 
 
(To be trained) 
• Finance & Admin 
Officer 
• Secretary 
• 2x logistics 
• drivers 
• cleaners 
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programme) arrived in mid-October, followed by seven expatriate dog handlers/ 
trainers seconded from the NPA Global Training Centre.  
 
Eight of the dogs were accredited by mid-December and were deployed with 
expatriate handlers to work on clearance operations. The remaining seven dogs were 
utilised for training the first group of Ethiopian handlers (all EMAO employees) in 
mid-December. Six of these dogs, with local handlers, were deployed in March 2006 
to demining operations, working initially under the supervision of two Bosnian 
handlers (the other expatriate handlers returned to Bosnia). 
 
An NPA monitoring mission in January 2006 reported very favourably on the 
progress of the MDD component, including the fastest start-up of an MDD project in 
NPA’s history and higher rates of productivity than NPA had expected.70  
 
NPA reports that the EMAO personnel assigned for training as dog handlers are very 
capable and well motivated. Some from the initial group will be selected for further 
training as supervisors. A second round of training for eight new handlers began 
during the Evaluation Team’s mission to Ethiopia. 
 
NPA has established a kennel facility in Gemhalo for the MDD. This location allows 
them to support four demining companies. The kennels are surrounded by several 
hundred 10m x 10m blocks for training, and by 100 10 x 10m blocks that are used by 
EMAO for accreditation. Both the kennels and the dogs are well maintained. As well, 
NPA maintains a stock of basic veterinarian supplies for treatment of minor dog 
health problems, but the closest veterinarians specialised in canine health are in Addis 
Ababa.  
Recommendation 5 
NPA should ensure that some of the local MDD personnel receive para-veterinarian 
training, with a focus on canine health. 
 
Recommendation 6 
NPA should formalise contingency plans for dealing with a serious injury or illness of 
an MDD. 
Accreditation  
EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for MDD are still based on the 
ArmorGroup modus operandi for free-running dogs. NPA dog procedures are based 
on the use of short- and long-leashed dogs. However, in a MDD workshop held by 
NPA for EMAO personnel during the first week of October 2006, the NPA approach 
was accepted by EMAO as the standard methodology for MDD operations. The 
evaluation team views the NPA SOP as the de facto standard for EMAO dog 
operations, which should now be formalised. 
Recommendation 7  
EMAO should formally adopt a revised SOP for MDD operations, adapted from NPA 
procedures. 
                                                
70 At 700-1000 m2 per dog per day, these remain lower than the productivity achieved by ArmorGroup 
dogs (2000 m2 per dog per day). NPA claims that its short-leash system results in higher quality (i.e. 
less likelihood of a missed device) than the free running or long-leash approaches.  
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MDD Training Centre 
Activity is underway to establish a dog training centre at Entoto, a short distance from 
Addis Ababa. This centre will be collocated with an EMAO training centre, and will 
be more convenient for the training and transit/transfer of dogs. The centre is located 
at almost 3000m altitude and should provide ideal training conditions for the dogs. 
 
This dog training centre component is running several months behind schedule due to 
various bureaucratic hurdles. At the time of the team’s mission, activity had just 
begun, but it appeared to be progressing well.  We see no cause for concern. 
4.3  Technical Survey Component 
Start-up 
The start-up of the Technical Survey component was scheduled to begin at the same 
time as the MDD component, but was delayed due to NPA’s inability to recruit a 
qualified Operations Manager.71 As an interim measure, NPA had its mine action 
programme director from Bosnia prepare an initial draft of an SOP for Technical 
Survey. He remained in Ethiopia to overlap with the newly recruited Operations 
Manager, who arrived in February 2006. Unfortunately, this individual has since been 
transferred. The replacement (a well-qualified and highly experienced Operations 
Manager from Bosnia) arrived a few weeks prior to the Evaluation Team’s mission. 
Development of a New SOP 
NPA have drafted a revised SOP for Technical Survey for consideration by EMAO. 
This would allow the use of MDD and/or machines to supplement manual deminers. 
The SOP was approved given interim approval by EMAO at the end of June 2006 
and, following and NPA workshop for the management of EMAO in early October, 
EMAO agreed to proceed with trials based on the new SOP. NPA planned to deliver 
the first course for surveyors in November 2006, following which the new SOP would 
be field tested – a process that will likely lead to further modifications. 
 
The new version of the SOP breaks down the process into two clear phases. Phase 1 is 
essentially a general survey process – the analysis of all available data (including 
Eritrean sketch maps) coupled with a visual inspection of the site. The outcome of this 
initial phase is the release of land that was recorded as suspect hazard area (i.e. from 
the HALO Trust survey or the ELIS), but which the data analysis and site inspection 
indicate is very unlikely to contain landmines or UXO. In Bosnia, this released land is 
termed Area without Obvious Risk (AWOR), and NPA has recommended the same 
terminology in the current SOP for EMAO.72 
 
Phase 2 of the Technical Survey process entails marking and recording the resulting 
minefield polygon. This polygon encompasses areas that are deemed very likely to 
contain mines (i.e. the ‘true’ minefield) plus a substantial safety margin. The new 
                                                
71 The huge expansion of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mine action programme in Sudan in 
2005, when over 50 international technical advisors were recruited, led to a shortage of well-qualified 
demining operations personnel with extensive international experience. Many other demining operators 
reported difficulty in recruiting adequately qualified and experienced personnel. 
72 EMAO now simply reclassifies the land in its IMSMA records as ‘reduced’. Procedures for formal 
handover to the local community of this land that has been released without intrusive measures having 
been taken are, apparently, not worked-out. (NPA, Monitoring Report, January 2006, p. 8) 
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SOP refers to these as ‘high risk’ and ‘low risk’ areas respectively. NPA operations 
personnel have been recommending that EMAO adopt a risk management approach in 
which the low-risk areas would be further ‘investigated’ with machines, MDD, and/or 
manual deminers. For example, where the terrain is suitable, a machine might pass 
over the entire low-risk area, followed by MDD on a portion of the area. If no 
evidence of landmines or UXO is found, the low risk area would be reclassified as 
AWOR and released for civilian use. 
 
The Evaluation Team understands that EMAO management has not yet accepted the 
recommendation to adopt a more aggressive risk management approach during the 
technical survey process. Such an approach does promise a significant reduction in 
costs per area of land released for civilian use. For example, in Bosnia, the intrusive 
‘investigation’ of low-risk land by machines backed by MDD or manual deminers73 is 
only 40% to 60% the cost of full-clearance.  
 
EMAO now possesses the range of assets needed to adopt a more aggressive risk 
management approach, but whether to do so depends critically on whether intrusive 
measures that fall short of full clearance reduce risk to an acceptable level.74 This 
relates not only to the performance capabilities of the machines, MDD, etc. in the 
range of conditions found in Ethiopia, but also on: 
 
• the skill and experience of the technical surveyors in correctly categorising 
some land as low-risk, 
• the knowledge local residents have about the likely boundaries of the SHA 
(e.g. from cultivation or previous accidents involving people or animals), 
• the authority delegated to technical surveyors to make such a decision – and 
their willingness to assume this responsibility,  
• the consequences should an accident occur on land that has been released 
following less than full clearance operations. 
 
There is also the question of the legal authority EMAO has to make a decision not to 
fully clear land that has been classified as suspect, and whether it or its personnel 
would be liable – even where all approved procedures were properly followed –
should an accident occur. 
 
It is appropriate that EMAO await further evidence that a more aggressive risk 
management approach is suitable for Ethiopia. However, it remains unclear to the 
Evaluation Team what amount of evidence would be required, and what 
complementary measures (e.g. strengthening the EMAO mandate) might need to be 
implemented before such a risk management approach could be adopted. 
 
                                                
73 This is actually termed technical survey in Bosnia, whereas the preliminary investigation and 
assessment (Phase 1 in the latest SOP for Technical Survey proposed by NPA for EMAO) is termed 
general survey. 
74 Even full clearance to IMAS standards cannot eliminate risk entirely – for example, some mines or 
UXO may be buried too deeply to detect with available technology. 
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Task Impact Assessment (TIA) 
TIA is the term NPA uses for its approach to the assessment of the likely socio-
economic benefits that will stem from clearance tasks. In brief, it aims to document:  
 
• the potential benefits from clearance 
• the likely beneficiaries 
• any problems or constraints that will prevent the target beneficiaries from 
using the freed land to its best potential, including: 
o land ownership disputes; 
o lack of complementary inputs (e.g. seeds for planting crops; livestock 
to graze the land); 
o whether clearance and land allocation can be completed in time for the 
planting season, arrival of pastoralists for grazing, etc. 
 
The basic aim is to ensure that expensive demining assets are assigned only to clear 
minefields where the potential benefits are likely to accrue to worthy beneficiaries 
without undue delay. NPA originally developed TIA in Angola during the late 1990s, 
where it was used to assess individual clearance tasks. It has since been adapted for 
use in other NPA programmes. It is most highly developed in the Sri Lanka 
programme, where it has evolved into a full ‘livelihoods analysis’ of mine-affected 
communities and is the principal tool used by NPA and district authorities to set mine 
action priorities. 
 
Textbox 10 – The Livelihoods Approach 
Livelihoods* analysis is a multi-sectoral, participatory approach developed to help understand 
and analyse the livelihoods of the poor, using the framework depicted below.  
 
The framework views people in a context of vulnerability, shown at the left of Figure One. 
Within this context, they have access to certain assets or poverty reducing factors (human, 
social, natural, financial and physical capital). The levels and utilisation of these assets are 
influenced by the external political, institutional and legal environment. Together people’s 
assets and the external environment influence household’s livelihood strategies in pursuit of 
beneficial livelihood outcomes. 
 
* A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for living. A livelihood is 
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sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base. 
Chambers & Conway, 1992, Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21
st
 century. IDS 
Discussion Paper 296. Brighton: IDS 
 
Because landmines block or damage assets, the livelihoods approach (which also 
focuses on assets) is particularly well suited to the analysis of the negative impacts of 
landmine contamination and of the benefits arising from mine action.75 It also is well 
suited to the analysis of food security issues,76 which are so critical in Ethiopia, and 
there are numerous studies employing livelihoods analysis in Ethiopia (although none 
incorporating the issue of landmine contamination). 
 
NPA brought-in their TIA advisor from Sri Lanka to adapt the system for Ethiopia 
and to train EMAO staff (principally, their community liaison/MRE personnel). 
However, the approach used in Sri Lanka requires wholesale adaptation to meet 
EMAO requirements, at least in the current stage of its demining programme. 
 
NPA Programme – Sri Lanka EMAO Programme – Ethiopia 
TIA teams operate independently of demining 
units. 
Plans are for TIA capability to be incorpor-
ated into Technical Survey teams, which 
operate in close support of the demining 
companies to which each is attached. 
TIA teams survey communities well in 
advance of demining, and the TIA findings 
are used to determine (i) where demining 
assets will be located in the coming season 
and (ii) which communities and specific tasks 
should be demined first. 
In Ethiopia, the allocation of demining 
companies to woredas and the tabia/kebele 
priorities have been determined based on 
long-standing plans for the resettlement of 
displaced people and are set as contractual 
obligations of EMAO to the ERPMU. 
NPA has considerable scope in determining 
its work programme. 
NPA is providing support to EMAO’s capacity 
development efforts. 
Local governments have been disrupted by 
the civil war and vary significantly in capacity. 
Local governments in Tigray Region function 
effectively. 
Continued internal tension/conflict disrupt the 
delegation of authority to local governments. 
Ethiopia in general, and Tigray in particular, 
are strongly promoting decentralisation. 
Continued internal tension/conflict mean that 
local priorities may not be known or endorsed 
by senior levels of government. 
The ERPMU and the Regional Governments 
established effective mechanisms for 
obtaining ‘bottom-up’ input, and local views 
are well-reflected in ERP plans.  
 
NPA realised that the TIA model used in Sri Lanka would have to be adapted for use 
in Ethiopia. In particular, the Sri Lanka model would have duplicated processes that 
already exist within Ethiopia’s increasingly decentralised governance structure, which 
have been further supplemented by the Emergency Rehabilitation Program 
management system.  
 
Decisions on local priorities should be determined by local decision-making processes 
whenever possible. Accordingly, NPA has shifted to an approach which will seek to 
fill gaps in the collection and analysis of socio-economic data as an input into 
priority-setting for demining activities. At the time of the mission, a second TIA 
advisor (also from NPA’s Sri Lanka programme) was working in cooperation with the 
Operations and the IMSMA sections in EMAO to document socio-economic data that 
has been collected for past demining tasks and through the current community liaison 
                                                
75 It has recently been used with great success in a post-clearance survey of 25 communities in Yemen. 
76 For example, livelihoods studies underpin the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). 
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process so an assessment of what data or data analysis might be usefully added to 
enhance the process. 
 
There do appear to be opportunities for improved sequencing of demining operations 
within the existing framework. These opportunities exist at the individual task level, 
where some fine-tuning might allow, for example, certain parcels to be cleared in time 
for planting that year by civilians from the local communities, or in closer 
coordination with other development initiatives (see textbox).  
 
Textbox 11 – Deminers farming on cleared land in Gemhalo 
During the site visits to Gemhalo in western Tigray, a member of the Evaluation Team 
observed that a significant area of demined land was being farmed by EMAO personnel 
based in that woreda. The explanation provided was that: 
 
• the land in question had not be cleared to enable the resettlement of war-displaced 
people, but to allow the voluntary resettlement of people from densely-populated eastern 
Tigray as part of a regional government resettlement scheme to enhance food security;* 
• there are, as yet, no farmers from local communities who are awaiting access to this land; 
rather, the area traditionally has been used as seasonal grazing land by nomadic 
pastoralists; 
• as the households from eastern Tigray had not yet been relocated to the west, local 
authorities allowed EMAO personnel to farm the land for this season. 
 
* This area of Tigray has been designated as a ‘growth pole’ by the Regional Government. 
 
As well, the EMAO personnel we met who had received the TIA training in August 
appeared to be enthusiastic about what they learned and eager to put at least some of 
the tools and concepts into practice. Thus there appears to be opportunities for 
applying TIA even within the existing framework for EMAO operations. 
Recommendation 8 
Within the current framework for EMAO operations, in which priorities are pre-
established to the tabia/kebele level, NPA should consider adapting the simpler, task-
specific TIA model used by NPA in Angola and Mozambique rather than the community 
livelihoods approach used in Sri Lanka.  
 
The task-specific model allows a determination of the likely benefits that will stem 
from the clearance of a specific hazard and identification of the likely beneficiaries. It 
may also identify any problems that might prevent or constrain the best use of the 
freed assets, allowing early action to address those problems in anticipation of 
clearance, or a decision to delay the clearance until after the problems are resolved. 
Recommendation 9 
TIA needs to be adapted to reinforce the existing tabia/kebele development planning 
processes. NPA and its EMAO counterparts should plan to participate in the next 
round of annual planning workshops in each of the tabias within which demining is 
planned for 2007-08. 
 
UNICEF has been working with the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development 
(BoFED) in Tigray on an Integrated Community Based Participatory Planning 
(ICBPP) project, designed to strengthen the annual planning process at the tabia level. 
As part of this project, it has developed a series of Field Guides for Focus Groups 
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covering a variety of issues (governance; infrastructure; women and children; water 
and sanitation; etc.).77  
Recommendation 10 
NPA and its EMAO counterparts should meet with BoFED officials in Tigray to explore 
the opportunity of adapting TIA tools to prepare an additional Field Guide for a Focus 
Group that would cover mine action issues, based on the series of Field Guides 
already prepared with the support of UNICEF. 
 
One potential benefit stemming from the introduction of TIA is the identification of 
needs or opportunities for complementary community development initiatives by 
other development actors operating in the vicinity of demining operations (currently 
Tigray). EMAO could be of great assistance in alerting development actors of the 
needs and opportunities for development assistance for mine affected communities. 
Recommendation 11 
NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a mapping of other development 
actors (NGOs and donor-supported programmes) operating in Tigray and assess 
whether opportunities exist to attract complementary development support to mine 
affected communities. 
 
The above recommendations relate to the current framework for EMAO operations. 
As noted elsewhere in this report, this framework will be changing significantly in the 
coming months and years. First, the ERP programme is drawing to a close, and 
EMAO will be shifting to a multi-donor environment in which its basic priorities are 
not specified as provisions in a contract. Second, in the coming years EMAO will be 
shifting its resources away from Tigray, where the local government structures are 
reasonably well-established, into other regions in which these structures may not 
operate as effectively or, at least, in the same fashion. Some research is warranted to 
prepare for this shift. 
Recommendation 12 
NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a review of the development 
planning and management systems in place in Ethiopia, including future plans for 
decentralisation, to understand how to adapt the basic TIA approach in a manner that 
complements and reinforces local and regional government planning mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 2 and Appendix 4 of this report provide an introduction to Ethiopia’s 
development planning and management systems, which can be used as a starting 
point. 
4.4  The NPA-EMAO Partnership 
It is clear that relations between NPA and EMAO were strained during the 
implementation of the Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey. Regardless, EMAO 
agreed to the new NPA project because (in the main): 
 
• it wanted to add MDD capacity without having to pay for the dogs with local 
funds (which would have been politically unacceptable); and 
• NPA was happy to play a role in supporting EMAO’s capacity development 
efforts, rather that establishing a separate operation. 
 
                                                
77 Copies of these were obtained by the Evaluation Team and left with NPA. 
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There have been further strains in the NPA-EMAO relationship since the current 
project began in October 2005. Some of these relate to frustrations over bureaucratic 
hurdles that took a significant amount of time to resolve (the protracted difficulties in 
obtaining duty-free access of vehicles for NPA being the prime example).  
 
While good progress has been made, it is not assured that the relationship between 
NPA and EMAO will evolve into a healthy and productive partnership. The 
underlying basis for such a partnership continues to exist – NPA can offer support for 
EMAO capacity development in areas which EMAO views as priorities. But EMAO 
and NPA are yet to arrive at full agreement on some of the key project components. 
NPA believes that EMAO could and should incorporate risk reduction explicitly into 
the Technical Survey process, but EMAO managers have not yet agreed to do this. As 
well, NPA is still working on adaptations to its Task Impact Assessment approach, 
but some EMAO managers appear unconvinced that TIA is the way forward. 
 
It is not necessary for two partners to see eye-to-eye on every issue – indeed, one 
should question the value-added of the partnership if this was the case. It is important 
however that partners have concrete mechanisms to work jointly on their common 
work programme, and to work through the problems and disagreements that 
inevitably arise.  
Recommendation 13 
EMAO and NPA should institute a system of regular meetings between the EMAO 
Director General and NPA’s Mine Action Programme Manager to discuss their joint 
work programme, review progress, identify problems, and agree on steps to resolve 
these problems. Action minutes should be taken to document any changes to plans 
and the commitments made by either party. 
 
The UN MAAT also plays an important advisory role that overlaps some components 
of the project agreement between EMAO and NPA, and should be represented at 
these meetings as well. 
 
It is premature to determine whether continued involvement by NPA would be 
warranted once the current project finishes at the end of 2007. In building effective 
partnerships, nothing succeeds like success, so the completion of the current project to 
both party’s satisfaction will be a critical determinant. As well, the Evaluation Team 
understands that UNDP plans a transition in its support, and will make a staged 
withdrawal of the technical advisors now in place over the coming year. Given this, 
EMAO may encourage NPA to provide advisory services that (i) allow access to 
lessons learned in other mine action programmes and (ii) provide an extra degree of 
assurance to donors who may not have the technical capacity to assess EMAO’s 
capabilities and operations on their own. 
 
Ultimately however, EMAO must determine its own capacity requirements and the 
support it needs to successfully develop those capacities. Capacity development plans 
should be derived from a national mine action strategy, a subject that we return to in 
the final chapter.  
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5.  Conclusions and Additional Recommendations 
 
The overall conclusions of the Evaluation Team are very positive. EMAO is a capable 
organisation. It has made excellent progress since its creation, and its demining 
operations compare favourably with those in other mine-affected countries. NPA 
assistance is well targeted, and NPA strategy to support the development of EMAO’s 
capacity is appropriate. While NPA has experienced some start-up problems, it has 
been able to manage these, in some cases with the intervention of EMAO. It seems 
likely that the project will achieve its principal objectives by the end of 2007.  
Ethiopia’s National Mine Action Programme 
Institutional make-up 
The decree establishing EMAO as a statutory body gave it a mandate as a mine action 
operator providing demining and MRE services. There is no other legal instrument for 
mine action other than a loan agreement between the Federal Government and the 
World Bank for the ERP, which accords key responsibilities (setting clearance 
standards; quality assurance; certification of clearance) to the ERPMU. The ERP 
programme ended on 31 December 2006. While EMAO is viewed by most as the pre-
eminent mine action organisation in Ethiopia, its legal authority is ambiguous in 
critical areas and it does not see its mandate covering all mine action pillars, such as 
stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of a State 
Party. In short, the institutional make-up for mine action in Ethiopia is deficient. 
 
EMAO management recognises this deficiency and has recommended in its corporate 
strategic plan (not yet adopted by the Government) that its mandate be enhanced to 
include responsibility and authority: 
 
• for quality assurance and certification; 
• for control, coordination, accreditation and licensing; 
• as the national focal point for any mine-action related affairs; and 
• to negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements. 
 
The Evaluation Team endorses EMAO’s recommendation as an interim measure, and 
with the following recommended additions: 
Recommendation 14 
In addition to the modifications recommended by EMAO in its corporate strategic plan, 
a new decree should: 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for preparing for approval by the Council 
of Ministers a national mine action strategy encompassing demining, MRE, 
stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of 
the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention; 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining the national mine action 
database, and for providing relevant mine action data to organisations 
responsible for the provision of development investments and the delivery of 
public services in mine-contaminated regions of Ethiopia; 
• charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining a national registry of 
landmine victims and a national surveillance system for recording accidents 
from landmines and other explosive remnants of war; 
  Evaluation of NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project & 
  Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
February 2007  Page 52  
• designate which ministries hold the lead responsibility for ensuring Ethiopia 
meets its various obligations as a State Party to the APMBC, including those 
for stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and transparency; 
• provide for each of the lead ministries to be represented on the Board; 
• designate the EMAO Board as the National Mine Action Authority. 
 
The ending of the World Bank-financed ERP means that EMAO needs to give greater 
attention to resource mobilisation from multiple donors. A common feature in the 
institutional make-up of donor-dependent mine action programmes is a formal 
mechanism for periodic meetings with donors. 
Recommendation 15 
EMAO and its Board should formally establish, with the support of UNDP, a Donor 
Support Group for the national mine action programme, with semi-annual meetings 
chaired by the Chair of the EMAO Board or the representative from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED).
78
 
Strategy and planning 
In the period from 1995-1998, the ERP worked in support of infrastructure 
development programmes (roads, power lines, telecommunications facilities). Given 
the importance of infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion in Ethiopia, these 
specific demining activities undoubtedly led to significant socio-economic benefits. 
However, the evaluation team was unable to obtain data to quantify what proportion 
of the ERP’s work was in support of such projects, or what other demining was 
undertaken, so we are unable to compare benefits to costs. 
 
Since the war with Eritrea, EMAO has worked principally as a contractor to the 
ERPMU in support of the Emergency Rehabilitation Program, focusing on Tigray and 
Afar. The available evidence from ERP’s own impact assessment indicates the ERP 
was successful in resettling the majority of the IDPs, and deportees/returnees, and that 
the demining component played a significant role in allowing resettlement and the 
resumption of sustainable livelihoods.  
 
The ERP Impact Assessment report found that “With the exception along the Mereb 
River and T/Abiabo and L/Adiabo, it is learned that practically all the IDPs have 
returned to their original places and resumed normal livelihoods.” (p. 69) The 
authors also found that residents have been made aware of the areas not yet fully 
cleared.79 (p. 69) 
 
                                                
78 Annex II of the financing agreement for the €8 million specifies annual review meetings chaired by 
MoFED, plus semi-annual review meetings organised by EMAO with cooperation from MoFED and 
UNDP.  
79 A Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice (KAP) survey commissioned by EMAO and UNICEF found 
83% of those interviewed in Tigray and Afar had received information on landmines and UXO. 
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However, some of the planned benefits from demining have not accrued because 
military movements along the border have created fears (i) that new mines are being 
laid, (ii) of overnight incursions by Eritrean security personnel, and (iii) that open 
warfare will resume. In addition, all the minefield had not yet been cleared at the time 
of the study,80 while some residents remain unconvinced that demined areas are 
completely safe. 
 
Figure 10 – Respondents stating that demining helped but has not eliminated problems 








Regardless, the authors of the ERP impact assessment concluded that “the impact of 
the de-mining activities is commendable.” (p. 70) They also concluded that “The 
experiences gained in successfully implementing the project, particularly the skills 
and experiences gained by the project staff at all levels…especially in mine clearance, 
have been remarkable and would remain to be useful in the future.” (p. vii) 
 
Thus, EMAO has been playing an important part in the strategy adopted by the 
Emergency Rehabilitation Program and, in this role, has made important contributions 
to Ethiopia’s development. EMAO has not to date, however, formulated a strategy for 
a national mine action programme (i.e. one that covers the country’s entire 
                                                
80 The report is dated June 2006, but does not clearly state when the questionnaire survey, interviews, 
and focus group discussions took place. At least some of the data the authors obtained from the 
ERPMU was from September 2005.  
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contamination problem and all components of mine action). It has submitted to the 
government a draft strategy as called for by the Civil Service Reform Programme, but 
this appears to be a corporate development strategy for EMAO rather than a national 
mine action strategy. Regardless, the draft strategy does not appear to fully analyse 
and address a number of strategic issues which are on the horizon, including: 
 
• the transition from World Bank loan financing to multi-donor grant financing; 
• transition from a focus on war-affected areas along the Eritrean border to a 
nation-wide programme; 
• shift from working on large minefields within a well-defined mine belt, to 
more varied and dispersed contamination problems, both large and small; 
• the need to assess MRE requirements throughout the country and the 
challenge of meeting the needs identified; 
• the need to address a range of Treaty obligations, including victim assistance, 
stockpile destruction, and transparency reporting. 
 
Given the tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and the instability in 
some of the neighbouring countries, some careful thought about disaster preparedness 
is also warranted. 
 
In addition, now that additional financing from the World Bank ERP loan is 
unavailable, EMAO will need to make a new case for funding from the Federal 
Government – donors will not continue to support a programme when there is no 
evidence the country’s government deems it of sufficient importance to allocate a 
reasonable portion of its own funds. To successfully make this case, EMAO will need 
to show how mine action promotes the country’s development priorities,81 such as 
food security and the expansion of the infrastructure system to reach more rural 
people. 
 
It is clear that the Director General of EMAO has thought about many of these issues. 
For example, he has plans to contact the governments of all regions that suffer from 
contamination to ask them for a preliminary ranking of priorities. However, it does 
not appear that the range of strategic issues have been analysed together in a 
systematic fashion to formulate a strategy for a national mine action programme. 
Recommendation 16 
EMAO should initiate a strategic planning process, using its corporate strategy and the 
findings from the ELIS as a base, to examine the full range of strategic issues on the 
horizon and with a view to formulating a strategy for a national mine action 
programme. 
EMAO Management 
EMAO’s Corporate Strategy clearly noted that one constraint is a very hierarchical 
structure and ‘top-heavy management.’ This corporate culture and style of 
management is consistent with the military background of most EMAO personnel, 
including its senior managers. While it often enhances control and efficiency, it places 
exceptional strains on a few key people. It also can result in unnecessary delays when 
                                                
81 Landmine contamination is not mentioned in the current PRSP, and we understand that EMAO has 
not engaged in the processes leading to the second-generation PRSP – the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). 
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those key people are absent. As well, a centralised management structure may be 
effective when large-unit operations are concentrated in few sites, but will be less so 




In preparation for the widening of the geographic scope of operations, EMAO should 
initiate a careful process of delegating greater decision-making authority. 
Priority-setting 
An effective priority-setting system for large-unit demining operations was put in 
place for the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme, with the ERPMU and regional 
governments establishing appropriate priorities based on the need to resettle large 
numbers of displaced people, coupled with general survey data from EMAO.  
 
The end of the ERP implies the need to update the priority-setting system based on 
existing development planning processes at the regional, woreda, and kebele levels. 
The TIA model used by NPA in Sri Lanka would largely duplicate these development 
planning processes and therefore needs to be adapted – a fact recognised by both 
EMAO and NPA. Once suitable adaptations are made however, TIA could provide 
the set of tools EMAO will require to set priorities in a transparent fashion, balancing 
local needs with national and regional development priorities. It could also be an 
effective mechanism for documenting that cleared land is delivering significant socio-
economic benefits, bolstering the case for continued support from both donors and the 
Federal Government.  
 
Some groundwork should be done to assess the local planning processes in other 
heavily contaminated regions to determine whether further adaptations to TIA will be 
required in the future. This information should be fed into the strategic planning 
process we have recommended above. 
Demining Operations 
CLEARANCE 
EMAO now possesses a range of demining assets. Its manual demining units are 
excellent. EMAO can also maintain this capacity through the delivery of refresher 
training based on feedback from its QA teams. EMAO has purchased suitable 
machines and maintains them well. MDD operations are undertaken effectively, and 
MDD capacity is expanding with assistance from NPA.  
 
EMAO’s company and platoon commanders and demining supervisors are skilled in 
managing the individual demining assets (manual, machine, MDD) and are rapidly 
gaining experience in the planning and implementation of integrated clearance 
operations. Exposure to other national programmes which employ the demining 
toolbox in an integrated fashion could accelerate the learning process. 
TECHNICAL SURVEY 
EMAO’s technical survey teams have developed the capacity for land release based 
on data analysis and site investigations, and are skilled in marking a minefield 
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polygon in preparation for clearance. Their mapping skills need upgrading. Risk 
management approaches need to be tested with NPA assistance and a decision made 
on whether to formally embrace a risk management approach within the technical 
survey process. 
RESPONSIVE OPERATIONS 
Adequate mechanisms do not yet exist to respond to requests for small scale clearance 
operations from communities that are distant from a demining company. The 
proposed Rapid Response Teams (RRT) will be an important addition to EMAO 
capacities to reduce the risks posed by landmines and other ERW. 
 
The absence of a nationwide victim surveillance system means that EMAO does not 
have adequate information for determining where RRT should be located or for 
proactive response to a change in the pattern of accidents (e.g. a spike in accidents 
due to tampering). 
MRE 
EMAO continues to provide effective MRE services in communities in the vicinity of 
demining operations. Some of the MRE services established by RaDO continue (e.g. 
through teachers and school-based clubs), but no longer in a systematic fashion. 
BoLSA (in Tigray) and DPPFSB (in Afar) have not assumed responsibility for 
ongoing provision of MRE in their regions. No MRE services are available to the 
majority of mine-affected communities in Ethiopia. 
 
A number of people registered criticisms with some of the specific findings and 
recommendations of the 2005 evaluation of Ethiopia’s MRE programme. On balance 
however, the conclusions presented in that evaluation report seem valid, and the 
recommendations should be reviewed, modified where necessary, and incorporated 
into the strategic planning process. 
Other Treaty Obligations 
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION 
Ethiopia has not submitted information on its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines, 
as required by the APMBC. 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
Modest victim assistance programmes are supported by LSN, ICRC (through the 
ERC), and others. No national needs assessment has been conducted and no national 
plan for victim assistance has been adopted. No national registry and surveillance 
system has been established. The MoLSA is responsible for programmes to assist the 
disabled, and has attended recent Meetings of States Parties to the APMBC, but it is 
not represented on the EMAO Board.  
REPORTING 
Ethiopia has not yet submitted its transparency report as specified in Article 7 of the 
APMBC. 
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NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project 
Project identification and design 
The philosophy underlying the project (i.e. support to EMAO’s capacity development 
efforts rather than establish an independent demining operation) is the correct one for 
Ethiopia. As well, the objectives established for the NPA project are relevant for 
Ethiopia.  
 
The outputs planned are appropriate to EMAO’s needs, but more investigation during 
the design phase may have revealed some differences in understanding concerning the 
appropriate model envisaged for the Technical Survey/TIA component.  
 
The MDD are meeting an important capacity requirement, and complement EMAO’s 
other demining assets. The SOP drafted for Technical Survey promises significant 
performance enhancements if the risk management approach is ultimately adopted, 
but further evidence is required from field tests of the SOP. The TIA model needs to 
be simplified to one that complements rather than overlaps with the established 
development planning systems in Ethiopia. 
Project implementation 
MDD COMPONENT 
The MDD component has achieved most of its very ambitious start-up objectives and 
is now operating effectively. Personnel assigned by EMAO to the MDD component 
are capable and well-motivated. The training provided by NPA has been effective, 
and the MDD teams are achieving productivity rates higher than in other NPA-
supported programmes. The construction of the Entoto training facility started late but 
is now underway and making good progress. 
TECHNICAL SURVEY 
This component is behind schedule due to the difficulty in recruiting a suitably 
qualified operations manager who could work well with EMAO counterparts MAAT 
personnel. NPA has taken appropriate ‘work-around’ measures to develop a new SOP 
for technical survey. Training of the first five Technical Survey Teams was about to 
start shortly after the end of the evaluation mission, following which the field testing 
of the SOP will begin. Validation of the risk management approach incorporated into 
the SOP would allow significant cost-efficiency enhancements for the demining 
programme. 
TASK IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
The TIA model needs to be simplified to one that complements rather than overlaps 
with established development planning systems in Ethiopia. Work is underway to do 
this. 
Evolution of the partnership with EMAO 
NPA and EMAO seem to be overcoming any initial mistrust of one another stemming 
from the tense relationship between EMAO and the NPA team that implemented the 
ELIS. NPA seems highly motivated to foster the partnership with EMAO, and has 
taken useful steps to ensure EMAO’s managers have the opportunity to benefit from 
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experienced garnered from other programmes (including managers from their Angola, 
BiH, and Croatia programmes in the January 2006 monitoring mission to Ethiopia; 
arranging for a mission by the EMAO Director General to Cambodia in 2006). Earlier 
assistance from EMAO to overcome various bureaucratic hurdles faced by 
international NGOs in Ethiopia would certainly help NPA and could accelerate 
progress on the project, to the benefit of both NPA and EMAO. 
 
The EMAO-NPA working relationship, and the likelihood of completing the current 
project to everyone’s satisfaction, would be helped by regular meetings between the 
two (which we have recommended elsewhere in the report). The UN MAAT should 
also be represented at most of these meetings. 
 
Progress of the development of a national strategy for mine action (recommended 
above) would provide the best basis for determining whether additional capacity 
development assistance from NPA will be warranted after 2007. 
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Ethiopia suffers from extensive contamination from landmines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) due to a series of internal and international armed conflicts, 
including: 
 
• the Italian invasion (1935-1936),  
• the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978),  
• the border war with Sudan (1980),  
• internal conflict (1975-1991), and  
• the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998-2000).82 
 
The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) undertaken from 2001–0483 found 
more than 1.9 million people living in a total of 1,492 mine-affected communities. 
Ten of the 11 regions are affected to some degree, but the bulk of the contamination is 
in Afar, Somalia, and Tigray.  
 
The ELIS also recorded 16,616 casualties, more that half of which were killed. 
Landmine Monitor has reported about 30 casualties per annum in recent years, but 
this is widely recognized as a partial accounting as systems are not in place to collect 
casualty data on a systematic basis, in part because the regions are responsible for 
health issues under the constitution.  
 
The war with Eritrea resulted in significant contamination of Tigray region and, to a 
lesser extent, Afar and left approximately 364,000 people displaced. Following that 
war, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) established the Mine Action Supervisory 
Board as the National Authority (with representatives of the ministries of defense, 
foreign affairs, finance, and transport and communication) and the Ethiopian Mine 
Action Office (EMAO) as the implementing agency.84  
 
Initial funding came principally via the World Bank-financed Emergency Recovery 
Project. Perhaps because of the World Bank funding, Ethiopia received relatively 
modest funding from traditional mine action donors until this year, when – following 
Ethiopia’s accession to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) in mid-200585 
– the EC announced a grant of €8 million (approximately US$10 million) over three 
years for demining in Tigray and Afar.86 Grants from other donor countries has been 
in the range of $2.5 million per annum in recent years. 
  
In August 2005, EMAO submitted a draft strategic plan for mine action to the Office 
of the Prime Minister, but this has not yet been formally adopted. The goal of the 
                                                
82 According to Landmine Monitor, there are unconfirmed reports of continued small scale mine laying 
due to banditry and fighting among warlords. 
83 In 2006 Ethiopia requested the UN endorse the ELIS, but this has not yet been done. 
84 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001. 
85 Ethiopia had signed in December 1997, but did not ratify for seven years. 
86 Part of this grant is channelled to EMAO through UNDP.  
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strategy is to make “Ethiopia safe for the people to be able to live free from the threat 
of landmines and explosive devices,” while specific objectives are to: 
• develop a fully national, sustainable mine action program; 
• increase its operational capacity and productivity for the clearance of 
contaminated land in the north (Tigray and Afar); 
• determine the entire mine action needs of Ethiopia, and develop a strategy that 
identifies the appropriate level of resources in a prioritized manner, within a 
reasonable timeframe; 
• mobilize the necessary resources to achieve the national mine action 
standards; 
• strengthen its capacity to manage, coordinate, and regulate mine action, in 
particular humanitarian clearance and mine risk education; and, 
• assist in victim assistance through the development of an information database 
on mine/UXO casualties, and through collaboration with the relevant agencies 
and organizations, where appropriate. 
 
In 2005, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) initiated a $4.4 million project to work with 
EMAO on demining, and specifically to enhance capacities in the areas of mine 
detection dogs (MDD) and technical survey. The project is designed to continue 
through the end of 2007, but which time NPA plans to have provided EMAO with: 
 
• 25 MDD, as well 20 trained handlers, of whom three will be qualified as 
supervisors and two as MDD instructors; 
• three technical survey teams, which will also be trained in Task Impact 
Assessment (TIA) techniques so they can assess the socio-economic impacts 
likely to accrue from possible clearance tasks. 
 
The NPA Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) project provided for a mid-term review. 
Following informal discussions, NPA wrote the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in June 2006, requesting the GICHD conduct a 
review to “explore the effectiveness of NPA HMA program and the impact of our 
activities.” In addition, NPA asked that the evaluation “provide input regarding 
possible ways forward for further program development and improvement.”87  
 
Because of this interest in program development, and because NPA’s core objective is 
to enhance EMAO capacity to reduce landmine accidents and facilitate safe 
settlement and land access for beneficiary groups, it made most sense to examine the 
NPA project within the context of the overall national programme. Accordingly, 
GICHD and NPA initiated discussions with EMAO and, subsequently, the three 
organizations agreed to combine a broader review of the national mine action 
programme with the mid-term evaluation of NPA’s project.88 Thus, the exercise is 
designed both to satisfy donor requirements and to contribute to EMAO’s strategic 
analysis and planning for mine action in Ethiopia. 
 
Scope and focus of the exercise: 
 
The evaluation and review will examine: 
                                                
87 Letter from Adam Combs, NPA Mine Action Adviser, dated 26 June 2006. 
88 Agreed during the annual UNMAS Meeting of National Directors in Geneva, July 2007.  
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• The assistance provided by NPA to support the development of EMAO capacities 
in MDD and technical survey (incorporating task impact assessment); 
• The effect of NPA assistance on EMAO’s capacity to plan and manage integrated 
demining operations using MDD, machines, and manual demining teams; 
• The role EMAO plays within Ethiopia’s national mine action effort; and 
• The contribution of the national mine action programme toward Ethiopia’s 
development, and efforts made to enhance the alignment between mine action and 
development priorities. 
 
Scope of the evaluation 
 
 
Textbox – Organisations active in Mine Risk Education (MRE)  
Working with the Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO – a local NGO) 
UNICEF has supported Mine Risk Education (MRE) for mine affected communities in Tigray 
(since 1999) and Afar (since 2001). In 2005, responsibilities in Tigray were transferred to the 
Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA). Also in 2005: 
 
• UNHCR engaged RaDO to provide MRE to Sudanese refugees prior to their repatriation; 
and 
• UNMAS, at the request of UNICEF, provided a train-the-trainers workshop on landmines 
and UXO  
• EMAO community liaison teams provide MRE in conjunction with demining operations. 
 
In addition, UNICEF and RaDO initiated a pilot village profile project in 11 villages along the 
border with Eritrea to discuss the communities’ mine action challenges in a development 
context and to collect data on casualties and survivor assistance needs. 
 
Textbox – Survivor Assistance  
At the Nairobi Review Conference, Ethiopia was identified as one of 24 States Parties with 
significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the 
greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, 
rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors. A year later at the 6
th
 Meeting of States Parties, 
Ethiopia announced some objectives for the period 2005-09, including: 
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• conducting a needs assessment of survivors;  
• making medical treatment available by informing people about the existing services;  
• improving access to physical rehabilitation, psycho-social support and economic re-
integration by establishing or strengthening clinics and services;  
• updating, developing and enforcing laws protecting the rights of people with disabilities, 
including mine survivors; and  
• developing a strategic plan for mine victim assistance in cooperation with relevant 
agencies and organizations. 
 
Purposes and Objectives: 
 
While the evaluation/review will promote accountability – (i) of NPA to both the 
Royal Norwegian MFA (RNMFA) and EMAO, and (ii) of EMAO both to national 
authorities and other agencies providing financial support – the emphasis will be on 
learning by generating lessons from: 
 
• NPA experience in implementing its project 
• EMAO experience in planning and implementing integrated demining operations 
• EMAO and mine action partner experiences in aligning mine action with 
development priorities 
 
The evaluation and review will also recommend further performance improvements 
based on these lessons learned. 
 
Audiences and Intended Uses: 
 
While the evaluation/review will be commissioned by NPA as per its grant agreement 
with the RNMFA, the main report is intended for a wider group of stakeholders, 
including: 
 
• the EMAO management team; 
• NPA managers (in Ethiopia and in Oslo); 
• other agencies providing financial support to Ethiopia’s mine action programme; 
• development management personnel at the national and regional levels; 
• other development agencies whose work programmes are affected by landmine 
and UXO contamination. 
 
The report should provide recommendations for performance improvements at the 
following levels: 
 
1. NPA project 
2. Integrated demining programme 
3. National mine action programme 
4. Links between mine action and development. 
 
GICHD shall facilitate a stakeholder workshop in Ethiopia to review the evaluation 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and to foster a consensus on how to 
implement the recommendations. 
 
 
Specific Issues and Questions: 
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• Is a fruitful partnership evolving between NPA and EMAO? 
o Does EMAO see NPA assistance to be well-targeted? 
o Does EMAO see NPA as a flexible and supportive partner? 
o Is there convergence in terms of EMAO & NPA views on how the 
partnership might evolve in the future? 
• Are the outputs planned for the NPA project appropriate to the needs of EMAO 
and the national mine action programme? 
• Have the planned outputs of the NPA project90 been achieved, or are they likely to 
be achieved by the end of 2007? 
• Are the demining assets provided or supported by NPA working safely and 
efficiently? 
 
INTEGRATED DEMINING OPERATIONS91 
 
• Are the findings of technical survey/task impact assessment being used effectively 
when establishing task priorities and demining plans? 
• Are the demining assets provided or supported by NPA being used effectively 
within demining operations? 
• Are there further enhancements to demining assets, SOPs, policies, etc. that could 
significantly enhance the efficiency or effectiveness of the demining programme? 
 
ROLE OF EMAO WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEMINING PROGRAMME92 
 
• Is the institutional make-up (legal & regulatory framework plus the key organs) of 
Ethiopia’s mine action programme appropriate to the country’s requirements? 
• Is EMAO effective in discharging its responsibilities? 
• Does the national mine action strategy identify appropriate initiatives for further 
performance improvements for the national programme and for EMAO itself, and 
has reasonable progress been made in implementing those initiatives? 
 
LINKING MINE ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT93 
 
• Is mine action appropriately reflected in Ethiopia’s development frameworks, 
plans, and programmes? 
• Has EMAO/mine action officials engaged in the process to formulate the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)? 
• Are EMAO and other mine action actors effective in aligning mine action with 
development priorities? 
o are development priorities explicitly considered when formulating annual 
plans and setting task priorities? 
                                                
89 See also Annex B for a checklist of specific technical and operational issues. 
90 See Annex A. 
91 See also Annex B for a checklist of specific technical and operational issues. 
92 See also Annex B for a checklist of more specific issues/questions. 
93 See also Annex B for a checklist of more specific issues/questions. 
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o are mine action personnel in regular contact with development authorities 
at the national and regional levels? 
o is joint planning conducted by EMAO and development planners at the 
sector or regional levels? 
o are potential development benefits and indicators specified within annual 
plans and task plans, and does the monitoring system track these 
indicators? 
o are development benefits accruing from mine action activities reported 
regularly to the Government and to donors? 
• Does the Government of Ethiopia demonstrate ownership of the country’s mine 
contamination problem? To what degree does the Government… 
o exercise its rights to (i) set priorities and the strategies for achieving these 
and (ii) seek and establish partnerships to support the national mine action 
programme? 
o meet its responsibilities to invest appropriate levels of resources in 
sustaining the programme and making it more productive? 
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Annex A – Planned outputs for NPA Project 
 
Capacity building 
1. MDD capacity 
1.1 25 mine detection dogs accredited  
At least 4 qualified as supervisors 1.2 20 MDD handlers trained & accredited 
(including support to technical survey) At least 2 qualified as trainers 
1.3 1 fully-equipped MDD mobile base  
1.4 1 fully equipped MDD training centre  
2. Technical Survey & Task Impact Assessment (TIA) 
2.1 6 TIA surveyors trained  
At least 3 qualified as Team Leaders 2.2 15 technical surveyors trained (including 
implementation of MDD-assisted tech survey) At lest 2 qualified as trainers 
Operational output targets 
1.1 MDD confirmed & verified land  (m
2
) 
2.1 Reporting planned socio-economic benefits No. of communities reported on. 
2.2 Suspect areas reduced through tech survey (m
2
) 
2.3 Task plans prepared by tech surveyors No. of tasks plans? 
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• Is NPA’s MDD SOP in accordance with IMAS? 
o Have the training and transfer of competence from NPA instructors 
to national handlers been according to NPA’s SOP and IMAS? 
o Was the accreditation of handlers and of MDD carried out in 
accordance with NPA’s SOP and IMAS?  
o Are the training and kennel facilities built and managed according 
to NPA and IMAS standards? 
o Is the operational MDD work conducted by NPA/EMAO according 
to NPA’s SOP and IMAS? 
• Can NPA further increase MDD productivity and cost efficiency while 
remaining IMAS compliant? 
• Can NPA improve in how it transfers competence from NPA instructors to 
local personnel? 
• Is the NPA MDD project proceeding according to agreed project 
documents, timeline and outputs? 
• Can the NPA MDD component deliver the output targets set-out in the 
project plan according to schedule? 
• Do EMAO and NPA agree on the MDD methodologies and standards that 
are appropriate to Ethiopia’s requirements? 
• Is the MDD capacity established within EMAO likely to be sustained?  
  
MDD Training Area 
 
• Is the Entoto Training Centre likely to fulfil the purposes for which it is 
being constructed?  
• Are the current plans for the centre cost efficient? 
• Is the Training Centre likely to be sustainable following hand-over to 
EMAO? 
 
Technical Survey (TS) 
 
• Is the (proposed) NPA TS SOP in accordance with IMAS? 
• In what ways can the SOP be changed to promote more land being 
released through additional or improved risk assessment/risk reduction 
activities? 
• To what extent does EMAO endorse the need for Task Impact Assessment 
(TIA)?  
• To what extent has EMAO incorporated TIA data gathering and analysis 
into its planning and priority-setting? 
• In what ways are NPA trained and monitored TS teams utilizing 
information from the Ethiopia Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS)? 
  Evaluation of NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project & 
  Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
February 2007  Page ix  
• Can ELIS data be more fully or differently used to promote better TS 
priority- setting and increased land release? 
 
Integrated Demining Operations 
 
• Is the mechanical ground preparation conducted by Bozena flail teams 
according to EMAO SOP and IMAS? 
• Are EMAO manual operations (training and implementation) according to 
EMAO SOP and IMAS? 
• Are EMAO Quality Assurance Teams adequately trained and able to assess 
the various demining capacities according to relevant standards? 
• Can EMAO operational planning be improved to promote better MDD 
productivity? 
• Are there other possibilities for improving the productivity of integrated 
operations? 
• Are there obstacles to further productivity improvements? 
 
Role of EMAO within the National Demining Programme 
 
• Do the various organisations involved in mine action in Ethiopia operate as 
efficient, goal-sharing partners 
• What forums are in place to promote information sharing (e.g. on new mine 
action technologies and developments) and coordination (operators, donors, 
etc.) 
• Does the EMAO command and control structure promote joint operational 
feedback, problem solving, and strategising for improvement 
• Does EMAO have a test and licensing regime in place to consistently ensure 
that all MDD and handlers operating in Ethiopia have the required skills?  
 
Linking Mine Action and Development 
 
• Do mine action and development planners have the information needed to 
identify areas where development and mine action can be linked?  
• What mechanisms are in place (or could be put in place) to promote 
development-related activities following or in conjunction with demining 
operations? 
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Appendix 2 – Itinerary & Persons Met 
 
ADDIS ABABA 
Saturday, 14 October – Arrival (Lardner & Paterson) 
Monday, 16 October 
NPA Mine Action Program Valerie Warmington, Manager 
UNDP MAAT Timur Obukhov, IMSMA Advisor 
Rannveig Rajendram, Head of Development Royal Norwegian Embassy 
Tor-Henrik Andersen, Secretary 
Tuesday, 17 October 
Scott Pilkington, Senior Technical Advisor UNDP MAAT 
Vic Thackwray, Operations Advisor 
NPA Mine Action Program Anna Roughley, Socio-economic Impact Advisor 
EMAO Etsay Gebre Selassie, Director General 
Wednesday, 18 October 
NPA Development Program Kjersti Berre, Resident Representative 
EC Delegation  Michael Hjelmaker, Social Sector Expert 
Thursday, 19 October 
ERPMU, MoFED Gemeda Aleme, ERP Program Manager 
MoFED Ato Fisseha, Head, Multilateral Branch 
Forum for Social Studies Taye Assefa, Research & Publications Director 
Chr. Michelsen Institute Johan Helland, Senior Research Fellow 
EMAO Etsay G. Selassie, Director General 
Friday, 20 October 
UNDP MAAT Scott Pilkington, Senior Technical Advisor 
World Bank Negede Lewi, Senior Operations Officer (Infrastructure) 
Tuesday, 24 October 
World Bank Abebaw Alemayehu, Senior Urban Development 
Specialist (ERP country officer) 
Landmine Survivors Network Bekele Gonfa, Director 
UNDP Archie Law, Regional Mine Action Advisor for Africa 
Wednesday, 25 October 
EMAO Etsay G. Selassie, Director General 
Daniel Mengestie, Head, Planning & Programming Ethiopian Roads Authority 
Taddele Debela, Head, Environmental Monitoring 
UNICEF Alessandro Conticini, Head, Child Protection 
Monday, 30 October 
EMAO Berhane Achame, Director, MRE 
EMAO Etsay G. Selassie, Director General 
Tuesday, 31 October 
Royal Norwegian Embassy Tor-Henrik Andersen, Secretary 
Yiberta Taddesse, Executive Director RaDO 
Ambachew Negus Hailu, National Mine Coordinator 
Wednesday, 1 November 
EMAO (advanced debriefing) Etsay G. Selassie, Director General  
Thursday, 2 November 
Debriefing at EMAO  
ELSEWHERE 
Wednesday, 18 October – Flight to Gemhalo (Larnder) 
Režad Januzagić, Operations manager NPA, Gemhalo 
Kenan Muftić, MDD coordinator  
Muez Gebre Tsadik 
Hiluf Mehari, MRE coordinator, 4 Company 
Edil Gebre Tsadik, MRE coordinator, 2 Company 
EMAO, Gemhalo 
Kinfe Kidane, MRE coordinator, 1 Company 
  Evaluation of NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project & 
  Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme 
February 2007  Page xii  
Company commander, 1 Company  
Company commander, 2 Company 
Thursday, 26 October – Flight to Mekele (Paterson & Seyoum) 
EMAO, Mekele Temesgen, Head, MRE, Northern Region 
Bureau of Labour & Social 
Affairs (BoLSA) 
Wolde Grebriel Genbre Medin, Head, Planning & Project 
Studies 
Yemane Yosef, Regional Economic Advisor Tigray Regional Authority 
Negesti Wolde Rufael, Regional Social Affairs Advisor 
Bureau for Rural Development Mezgebe Tsegaye, Deputy Head 
Fisseha Tawek, Head of Aid Coordination and Monitoring  DPPC 
Teklehaimanot Mikael, Coordinator, Emergency 
Programmes 
RaDO Berhanu Abraha, Acting Coordinator, Tigray 
Friday, 27 October 
Bureau for Finance & Economic 
Development (BoFED) 
Araya Tesfay, Head of Planning & Budgeting 
EMAO, Mekele Branch Alem Teklu, Manager, Northern Region 
Drive to Adigrat, with site visits of areas mined by the Derg 
Tigray Regional Government Meruts Fisseha, Head of Security and Administrative 
Affairs, Eastern Zone 
Saturday, 28 October – Site visits in Fatsi, Zala Ambessa, Doha, & return to Mekele 
Yergalem Hadush, Head, Gulomakeda Woreda 
Tewelde Alemayehu, woreda Deputy Administrator 
Office of Labour & Social Affairs 
(OLSA) 
Tsehaye Araya, woreda RTF coordinator 
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Appendix 3 – Mine Action Programme Timeline 
 
Year(s) Highlights 
1935-36 Italian invasion & UXO contamination 
1977-78 Ogaden War with Somalia 
1980 Border war with Sudan 
1975-90 Internal conflict 
1995 Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) begins with US assistance to non-combatant 
Army demining unit 
1995-98 EDP runs with 2, then 3 army companies in Somali, North, & Central Ethiopia 
1997 Ethiopia signs the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty 
1998-2000 Border war with Eritrea (cessation June 2000) 
1999 The World Bank, then UNICEF, begin funding RaDO for MRE 
Dangerous area survey by HALO Trust starts (October) 2000 
World Bank loan for Emergency Recovery Project (ERP) signed (December) 
EMAO established (February) 
U.S. assistance via RONCO (retrain & partially equip) 2 companies 
UN MAAT established 
2001 
HALO Trust Dangerous area survey completed 
Demining priorities determined by the ERP & Tigray & Afar governments. 
EMAO receives 1
st
 demining contract from ERPMU 




 demining company trained 
2003 EMAO initiates community liaison  
 UNICEF & RaDO begins transition of responsibility for MRE to Regional Govts.  
2004 ELIS completed (but not submitted for certification) 
 Cranfield provides assistance for strategic planning  
 4
th
 demining company trained 
 3 mechanical & 6 MDDs introduced 
 EMAO QA operations start 





 demining companies trained by EMAO trainers 
 Technical survey starts in Somali region 
 Evaluation of MRE commissioned by UNICEF 
 Ethiopia becomes a State Party to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty 
 NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project starts 
2006 RaDO undertakes village profiling study. 
 EMAO requests UNMAS to certify ELIS 
 EMAO submits draft National Mine Action Strategy 2006/07-2011/12 
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Appendix 4 – Development Management in Ethiopia 
1  Constitutional Arrangements 
A new Constitution was adopted in December 1994, establishing a bicameral 
legislature (the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation, with 
the later dealing largely with intergovernmental affairs). The Federal executive 
consists of a President and a Prime Minister who heads the Council of Ministers. The 
Council carries out the functions assigned to the Federal Government (monetary 
policy, foreign relations, defence, etc.) and designs national policies providing 
guidance to lower levels of government/administration (see textbox). In addition to 
implementing policies with nation-wide benefits, central ministries support their 
regional counterparts by undertaking research, collecting data, and providing technical 
assistance and advice. The Federal Supreme Court has the highest judicial power and 
is the court of final appeal for regional cases. 
Textbox 12 – Administrative structure in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has five levels of public administration, with the Federal Government as the top tier. 
 
Region is the second tier. There are nine regional governments and two special city 
administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). 
 
The third tier is the zone. This structure is not assigned power in the Constitution, and serves 
an administrative coordinating function. There are 66 zones. 
 
Woreda is the fourth tier in the structure, and is elected. The average population of a woreda 
is about 100,000. Currently, there are over 525 woredas, but more are being created through 
a woreda restructuring process now underway. 
 
The lowest tier in the administrative structure is the kebele (in urban areas) or Peasant/ 
Farmer/Pastoralist Association Area (in rural areas), with various regional names such as 
tabia in Tigray, which typically covers 5-10 small communities/villages. There are about 
15,000 kebele. 
 
There may be another structure below the kebele, such as the kushet in Tigray at the village 
level. There are an estimated 150,000 villages.  
 
The next three levels of government (zones are administrative structures and not 
governments) have more or less the same structure: a legislative body, a court system, 
and a number of sector administrative units that constitute the executive branch. 
2 Decentralisation 
Recognising Ethiopia’s ethnic and socio-economic diversity,94 the current government 
has been strongly committed to decentralisation, instituting the first wave in the mid-
1990s by transferring expenditure responsibilities to the regions.95 This was followed 
                                                
94 The Preamble of the Constitution starts with "We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia..." A 1991 Proclamation that establishes national regional self-government recognizes 63 
different ethnic groups, 48 of which are large enough to be able to establish their own self-government 
structures at the woreda level, the fourth tier of the government, or above. 
95 Public servants were also transferred. The largest region (Oromiya) estimated it needed 88,000 staff 
excluding the health and education sectors. 
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in 2002 by a second wave in which many regional expenditure responsibilities were 
transferred to woredas – a reform piloted in the four regions, including Tigray.96   
 
As a result, local governments now have the primary responsibility for basic service 
delivery, including education, health, agriculture extension, water, and local roads, as 
well as for food security and social safety nets. The sub-national share of consolidated 
government expenditure grew from a quarter in 1999/00 to a third by 2002/03. 
However, 85% of government revenues are collected by the federal government, 
leaving a large fiscal mismatch between revenues and expenditure mandates. 
 
To address this asymmetry, the federal government provides significant unconditional 
grants to the regions, which finance three-quarters of sub-national spending.97 The 
relative allocations to various regions are determined by a formula incorporating 
variables for regional population (55% weight in 2003/04), percentage of residents 
living under the poverty line (10%), a development index that measures public 
services provision such as student-teacher ratios (20%), and a revenue effort index 
calculated as the ratio of own revenue to recurrent spending (15%). Regions then use 
a simplified version of the same formula to determine woreda allocations.98 The effect 
of this formula – heavily weighted by population – is that more developed regions 
with larger numbers of schools, health clinics, etc. per capita may not receive 
sufficient funds to cover their recurrent spending obligations.  
 
The ‘offset’ is an important feature in the current system for unconditional grants. 
Basically, if the Federal Government is aware of aid funds flowing directly to a 
regional government, it offsets (i.e. deducts) 100% of that amount from the 
unconditional grant to that region. This is a strong disincentive for a Regional 
Government to seek aid directly from donors, as the unconditional grant will be 
reduced by an equal amount, without an allowance even to cover the transaction costs 
of negotiating the grant and reporting to the donor.  
 
Apparently, foreign aid given to NGOs for their projects in a region are not captured 
by this system, so no offsets in the unconditional grants are made by the Federal 
Government. 
 
Aid flowing through a programme administered by the Federal Government which is 
spent primarily in one or two regions (such as the Emergency Rehabilitation Program 
and the demining programme of EMAO) is not offset. 
 
Regional governments can decide whether to apply the offset system when calculating 
their grants to woredas. Tigray does not offset. 
Regional governments 
The regions have significant power under the Constitution, and can establish an 
administration for self-government and democratic rule, enact a state constitution and 
other laws, formulate and implement economic, social, and development policies and 
                                                
96 See Appendix 4 for the breakdown of expenditure responsibilities among levels of government. 
97 Even with these unconditional grants, regional governments have on average only about $10/yr. per 
capita for expenditures, 90% of which goes to recurrent costs (salaries, maintenance, supplies, etc.). 
98 In Tigray, the Regional Government has decided to transfer 70% of available funds to the woredas. 
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strategies,99 administer land and other natural resources, collect taxes not reserved for 
the Federal Government, and maintain security forces. 
 
The elected Regional Council adopts regional legislation and approves the budget and 
development strategy. Members of the Regional Council appoint from among 
themselves an Executive Committee that oversees day-to-day administration. The 
Council also appoints a President to perform the executive functions, and a set of 
Bureau Heads who act as the regional equivalent of ministers. The number of Bureaus 
and their division of responsibilities may vary among regions. All regions have 
Finance and Economic Development Bureaus, and sector bureaus in priority areas 
such as Agriculture, Education, Health, and Roads. Functioning as regional ministries, 
bureaus prepare short- and long-term action plans in keeping with central government 
targets. Regions also have their own civil services, although pay and conditions of 
services are aligned with the Federal Civil Service. Regional supreme courts oversee 
the interpretation of regional constitutions and the application of regional laws. 
Zonal administration and Woreda governments 
The structure of sub-regional government varies, as each region is given the right to 
adjust its institutions to suit its needs. Zones are mentioned in the Constitution as 
structures for "administrative convenience." Zonal administration consists of a set of 
counterparts to the Regional Bureaus, which aggregate information coming from a 
number of woredas. In most regions, zonal administration is appointed by the regional 
government.  
 
Constitutionally, the woreda, the lowest level of elected, full-time government 
(covering roughly 100,000 people) is the most important unit of sub-national 
government. Woredas consist of an elected council, a president chosen from among 
the council, and a set of sectoral offices. In most cases, these sectoral offices serve as 
implementing agencies and contact points with the communities rather than as 
development policy planners.  
 
Within woredas, communities organize themselves into kebele (in urban areas) or 
peasant associations. Kebele usually have an elected leader and a small council, but 
these officers are not part of the paid, full-time government structure. 
3  Elements of Economic Management 
Public expenditure management 
While many national mine action programmes are financed almost entirely by donors, 
national governments in mine-affected countries must eventually allocate their own 
resources to sustain the programme. To ease the transition, very poor countries such 
as Ethiopia may decide to take loans from the World Bank or the regional 
development banks (the African Development Bank in the case of Ethiopia), which 
they can obtain at highly concessional rates.  
 
                                                
99 The Tigray Regional Council has just recently adopted its first Five-Year Development Plan, which 
will provide the framework for multi-year planning by woredas and by the sectoral bureaus. Woreda 
and sector plans will be ‘rolling’ (i.e. updated every year). 
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Mine action officials and advisors need to understand public expenditure management 
– and particularly budget management – to secure government funds for mine action. 
As governments in most mine-affected countries face extremely tight budget 
constraints, it is unlikely they will be able to find adequate resources from their own 
sources to sustain the essential components of a mine action programme in the short-
term (one or two years). Loans from development banks also take years to put in 
place. Thus, mine action officials and advisors should start the process of obtaining 
government funding100 years in advance, even when donor funding seems secure in 
the medium term. 
Textbox 13 – Funding mine action in Ethiopia  
Ethiopia has had an unusual pattern of funding for mine action to date. After receiving training 
and equipment support via the U.S. Ministry of Defense, the government financed the 
operations of the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) for over two years. Following the war with 
Eritrea, the government obtained a World Bank loan that financed the bulk of demining for five 
years. Starting in 2007, most of the funds will be coming from donor grants.  
 
This is the precise opposite of the pattern seen in most poor countries, which begin with 
donor grants, then start using loan funds for demining in support of reconstruction and 
development projects, and (presumably, as few countries have made this transition fully) 
eventually finance mine action from their own sources of revenue. 
 
Although Ethiopia’s pattern has been reversed, and donor funding will enable EMAO to 
complete the bulk of the demining, it will again need to get funds through the government 
budget to complete demining its known minefields and address the residual risk. 
BUDGET MANAGEMENT 
Sound public expenditure management follows an annual cycle: (i) planning, (ii) 
execution, (iii) monitoring and reporting, (iv) audit and evaluation, which informs 
future cycles. The budget is the key instrument, indicating how a government 
allocates financial resources to various priorities and serving as the principal 
(although, often, inadequate) mechanism by which the legislature can hold the 
executive to account.101  
 
The Ethiopian Fiscal Year follows the Ethiopian Calendar running from (in our 
calendar) 8 July to 7 July the following year.102 However, budget planning should 
begin in January to give time for work planning by the government departments and 
the regional governments.103 Budget planning in Ethiopia has been complicated due 
to: 
 
                                                
100 Many mine-affected countries have access to three main sources of funds they can allocate through 
their budgets: (i) own source revenue (taxes, fees, sales of assets, etc.); (ii) loans (particularly external 
loans from the development banks); and, increasingly (iii) direct budget support from donor grants.  
101 In the vast majority of countries, the legislature must pass the budget, and in most countries, the 
legislature receives the annual report on government financial statements from the Supreme Audit 
Authority (e.g. Auditor General). Recently, an Auditor General in Ethiopia was sacked for critical 
comments concerning the expenditure reporting by the regions.  
102 The Ethiopian Calendar year 1999 began in July 2006. 
103 The budget planning phase usually entails (i) projecting revenues for the coming year; (ii) issuing a 
call for budget proposals (the ‘budget circular’) to government departments, often with targets 
(preliminary allocations) for each , (iii) negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the other 
departments, (iv) cabinet decision, and (v) legislative approval. 
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• delays in reporting of prior year expenditures by sub-national governments (in part 
because they perform most functions manually).104 This limits the ability of policy 
makers to understand the relationship between spending on programmes and 
socio-economic outcomes (e.g. how much money is required to raise school 
enrolment levels to the target levels). 
• incomplete and late reporting by donors on the destination and sector composition 
of grant-financed project spending. This is critical as aid averages about 35% of 
consolidated government expenditures. Again, the absence of full and timely 
reporting from donors limits the ability of national policy makers to understand 
the relationship between programme spending and socio-economic outcomes.  
 
As a result, there often are wide variances between actual and budgeted expenditures, 
particularly in the regions (which suffer in part because the Federal Government has 
not been able to adhere to its budget calendar, and advises regions of the amount of 
their unconditional grants too late for the regions or the woreda to do their own 
budget planning adequately).105 Regardless, budget execution has been relatively 
disciplined, with low levels of corruption relative to many other countries in the 
region, and no significant expenditure arrears (i.e. unpaid bills). 
EXPENDITURE PLANNING OVER THE MEDIUM-TERM 
A budget should be the financial reflection of the government’s plans for coming 
year, but all too often budget planners are prisoners of past decisions – programmes 
can’t be cut to reallocate resources to higher priorities because programme staff and 
beneficiaries would fight the cuts. Thus, drastic changes often are not politically 
feasible, and changes have to be planned over the medium term. This means that – in 
most countries – mine action officials and advisors will need to work for years to 
secure adequate financing from the government to sustain the national mine action 
programme. Typically, they will need first to get some amount – usually inadequate – 
in the annual budget for mine action, while building the case for increased support 
over the medium term. In Ethiopia’s case, this means working with officials from the 
ministry responsible for mine action (currently, the Ministry of Federal Affairs) to 
ensure the requirements for mine action are reflected in two instruments – a Macro 
Economic and Fiscal Framework (MEFF) and the Public Expenditure Program (PEP) 
– which are being introduced as part of the country’s expenditure planning reform. 
 
The MEFF provides a three-year forecast of fiscal aggregates (e.g. total revenues and 
total expenditures) while the PEP outlines planned expenditures over the coming three 
years by sector. Reportedly, progress has been achieved in both efforts, and the PEP is 
being introduced at the regional government level. The PEP will then be a key tool for 
costing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP – see the next section). 
                                                
104 In Tigray, a financial management information system was installed two years ago. Efforts are 
underway to install the same system in the 46 woredas, but many have problems with electrical power 
and/or personnel – only 13 are up and running. 
105 Last year however, the Regional Governments were given preliminary estimates for their grants in 
February, and learned the exact amount in April-May, so improvements are being made. 
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Development planning and management 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
The Government of Ethiopia seeks to promote rapid, broad-based, and equitable 
growth, and has decided to adopt a market-led strategy. Because the vast majority of 
Ethiopians live in rural areas, equitable growth must be based on rural development. 
This will require massive investments in physical capital (roads, telecommunications, 
and public services actually reaching rural communities) and human capital (so people 
are able to take advantage of market-based opportunities). As development planners 
in Addis Ababa cannot know in detail what rural communities most need, the Federal 
Government has adopted a strong decentralisation programme which (in tandem to 
market-led growth and human capital development) is intended to empower the poor 
and expand the choices and control that people have over their lives. 
 
These strategic elements are reflected in the 2002 Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) – Ethiopia’s initial PRSP. 
 
Textbox 14 – The 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) 
The SDPRP outlined the fundamental development objective of the government as the 
building of a free-market economy which would enable: 
• rapid economic development; 
• reduced dependence on food aid; and 
• the poor to be the main beneficiaries from economic growth. 
 
To promote this objective, the strategy rested on four pillars: 
 
1. Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), which emphasized food 
security and, because demand-growth from Ethiopia’s relatively small urban 
population would be modest, envisaged rapid growth in agricultural exports; 
2. Justice system and civil service reform,  
3. Decentralization and empowerment, and  
4. Capacity building in public and private sectors. 
 
Neither landmine contamination or mine action is mentioned in the SDPRP. 
 
The Government has been working on a ‘second generation’ PRSP, called the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) to run until 2011, 
but this has not yet been released. 
Coordination with other development actors 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 
Ethiopia has traditionally received about half the aid per capita than other sub-Saharan 
African countries (this based more to the fact that the country was never truly 
colonised and its large population than on need).106 During the 1970s and 1980s, 
much of the aid that was received was for humanitarian assistance rather than 
development investment. Aid flows began to pick-up in the mid-1990s, falling 
temporarily during the war with Eritrea, then rising again. In recent years, Ethiopia 
has received about $15-$20 per capita (still lower than the SSA average), although 
                                                
106 Many studies have shown that, on average, former colonies and small countries receive more aid per 
capita. 
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much of this still flows through NGO networks rather than official channels. 
Economic modelling suggests that aid flows would have to triple by 2015 if Ethiopia 
is to meet its MDGs. 
 
Ethiopia has also been one of the pilot countries for work on Harmonization and 
Alignment of donor practices, and has made significant progress towards coordinating 
assistance and harmonizing ODA flows.107 Until the 2005 elections, the donor 
community had been supportive, forming a Donor Assistance Group (DAG) co-
chaired by the Government and the World Bank, and shifting more funds into 
programme and budget support. In November 2005, the DAG issued a joint statement 
stating donor agreement to: (i) move away from direct budget support in favour of 
alternative instruments that would provide greater oversight of poverty reducing 
expenditures and promote increased accountability; (ii) reduce aid over time if 
governance does not improve; and (iii) focus on new governance programs. 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) 
The government recognises that NGOs are involved in the core poverty oriented 
sectors such as agriculture, health, education, water, rural roads and other rural 
development activities. The government believes that NGOs are involved in around 
1200 projects, with health, agriculture and rural development as the major sectors. 
 
The government tries to coordinate the work of the NGOs in the context of its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (the SDPRP, soon to be replaced by the PASDEP), with the 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) responsible for this down to 
the woreda level. In Tigray for example, the DPP Bureau monitors about 25 NGOs 
(three or four of these are international). They have regional coordination meetings 
annually, and semi-annually organise joint monitoring missions of NGO activities, 
with all sector bureaus involved.  
4  Disaster Management & Related Issues 
DPPC also takes the lead role in coordinating the emergency responses to disasters.108 
In Tigray, in the past five years, the DPP Bureau has also assumed responsibility for 
‘resettlements’ such as the voluntary resettlements from the overcrowded highlands in 
Eastern Tigray to the lower areas in Western Tigray. This is important for mine action 
as the bulk of EMAO demining resources are now based in the Kefta Humera woreda 
in Western Tigray, to clear land for resettlements. 
 
Textbox 15 – Possible future conflict in Humera 
Growing pressure on land and other natural resources has been leading to conflicts between 
pastoralists and farmers throughout much of Africa, including Ethiopia. In many cases, 
governments promote voluntary resettlement of farmers onto grazing lands traditionally used 
by pastoralists. This promises to raise total food production and reduce food insecurity, 
because nomadic herders typically use the land for only a few months in a year. However, if 
the pastoralists have no alternative options for grazing livestock in those months, their 
                                                
107 The expected outcomes of harmonisation were (i) enhanced aid delivery targeting the poor; (ii) 
strengthened government capacity, increased service delivery, and broad-based ownership; (iii) 
development cooperation aligned with the SDPRP, with a larger share as direct budget support; and (iv) 
improved DAG-Government partnership structure and policy dialogue. (DAG, 2002)  
108 In Tigray, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), which used to be an arm of the TPLF but is now 
officially an NGO, is also extremely important in the implementation of relief operations. 
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livelihoods may become unviable. Often the solution proposed by governments is to 
encourage the pastoralists to settle and convert to crop farming – an option many pastoral 
communities find unacceptable. 
 
A number of groups have been working on dispute resolution measures to protect pastoralist 
livelihoods. In Somali region, the government has adopted policies to protect nomadic 
communities. In Tigray however, the Evaluation Team understands the Regional Government 
has not adopted such policies. 
 
EMAO currently has many of its assets in Humera, demining land traditionally used by 
pastoralists on which the government of Tigray is planning to resettle farmers. While this is in 
keeping with Ethiopia’s and Tigray’s food security policies, there is potential for future conflict 
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Appendix 5 – Expenditure Assignments 
 
Level of Government Expenditure assignments 
Federal • Defence 
• Foreign relations 
• Justice and internal security 
• Macro stabilisation 
• International trade 
• Currency and banking 
• Immigration  
• National interest capital 
projects 
Shared, federal & 
regions 
• Environment 
• Vocational & preparatory 
schools 
• Airlines & railways 
• Police  
• Justice 
Regional • Secondary education 
• District & referral hospitals 
• Nursing schools 
• Water supply 
• Regional & zonal roads 
• Regional police 
• Maintenance of irrigation 
• Maintenance of small-scale 
water supply projects & 
energy programs 
• Agricultural planning 
•  
Shared regional & 
woreda 
• Small-scale capital projects  
Woreda • Primary education 
• Basic health care 
• Agricultural extension 
• Veterinary clinics  
• Land use administration 
• Water development, wells 
construction & maintenance 
• Local police 
• Local roads 
Source: IMF, 2004, 35. 
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